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THE SOURCES OF STATUTORY MEANING:
AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL CASE STUDY OF

THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
John C. Roberts*

HANKS to Justice Antonin Scalia's tireless advocacy and persistence since arriving on the Supreme Court in 1986, the subject of
statutory interpretation has enjoyed an unprecedented renaissance
in recent years.1 Legal scholars, philosophers, political scientists and
judges have all participated in the debate, employing a variety of analytical tools and revealing a spectrum of views about the roles of courts,
agencies, and Congress. This Article makes no pretense of advancing the
theoretical discussion concerning the rival schools of statutory interpretation. Rather it seeks to shed light on the real world of statutory meaning

through an in-depth case study of one current controversy.
One of the lessons emerging from a close reading of difficult statutory
interpretation cases, and from the scholarly literature, is that all problems
of statutory interpretation are not alike. Moreover, differences in the origin and characteristics of particular disputes over statutory meaning may
justify different analytical approaches. This Article deals with one of the
most challenging and difficult contexts in which the meaning of a statute
may be brought into question. First, the case study involves a complex
regulatory statute with a number of interrelated parts. Second, it involves
a powerful and well-entrenched regulatory agency with established expertise in the subject matter. Third, it involves a technologically sophisticated subject. Fourth, the statutory terms at issue have a long history
* Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, DePaul University College of Law. I am
indebted to DePaul students Todd Keeler and Meg Cook for their excellent research assistance, and to Dean Teree E. Foster and the DePaul Faculty Research Fund. I learned how
to read and write statutes during three years as General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1977-1980. I am especially grateful to the late Senator John C.
Stennis for his tutelage in the ways of the Senate and to the outstanding staff of the Office
of Senate Legislative Counsel for teaching me about statutes.
1. The following is an idiosyncratic selection of articles representing recent scholarship: William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P, Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423
(1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's
New Hypertextualism:An Invitation to Cacaphony and Incoherence in the Administrative
State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the
CoordinatingFunction of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 231; M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 299 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
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involving not only Congress, but the agency and the federal courts as
well. Finally, the controversy affects important business interests and
thus brings into play corporate and trade association actors often absent
from these sorts of controversies.
Thus, the lessons drawn from this case study may be of limited relevance to a narrower dispute over statutory meaning. Since complex regulatory schemes are a frequent tool of the modem legislature, however,
these more difficult interpretive tasks are increasingly common. And
since this story involves some unique interpretative techniques, it may
well have some more general lessons to teach about the process of establishing a particular meaning.
My title suggests an archaeological metaphor. Indeed, for complex disputes over statutory meaning that involve Congress, the regulatory
agency, the courts, and powerful industry groups-all acting over many
years-the process is much like excavation. The analyst must dig through
layers of meaning to arrive at a clear understanding of the statute, just as
the archaeologist finds older tools and pottery remains at many levels to
help explain the development of modern-day civilization. The archaeological metaphor is helpful not in the sense that some concrete discovery
lies at the bottom of the excavation that "solves" the interpretive puzzle,
but rather in the more subtle sense that all discoveries at each layer of
excavation must be pieced together in the end, and properly weighed, in
order to illuminate meaning.
The plan of attack is as follows. Part I addresses the background and
importance of a current controversy over the meaning of key definitional
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Part II explores the
specifics of the current controversy and the positions of the parties on
issues of statutory meaning. We will also describe a unique process employed in this situation to join the debate over statutory meaning among
the various interests. Part III conducts an independent exploration-an
archaeological dig, if you will-into the many sources of statutory meaning involved in this controversy, in order to evaluate the competing
claims being made. Finally, Part IV looks at possible wider implications
and general lessons.
It will soon be apparent that I am not entirely neutral in the current
factional fighting between competing schools of statutory interpretation.
I am most assuredly not a textualist follower of Justice Scalia. Indeed, the
whole purpose of this Article is to explore sources of meaning that Justice
2
Scalia would dismiss at the outset as both irrelevant and unknowable.
As one who spent three years as General Counsel to an authorizing committee of the United States Senate and who teaches legislative process
and administrative process to law students, I believe firmly that legislative
history is both relevant and necessary in applying statutes to real world
2. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
16-23 (1997); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-530 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
THE LAW
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situations. I join those, like Justice Breyer, former Judge Mikva, and
others, who seek a more sophisticated use of legislative history materials
and a deeper understanding of the legislative process as a background to
statutory interpretation. 3 In fact, as this case study shows, it may be necessary to broaden the inquiry even further in some especially complex
disputes over statutory meaning. Just as Justice Scalia advocates in cases
involving the meaning of some constitutional terms, we may be required
to delve far beyond traditional pre-enactment legislative history in order
to come up with a "right" answer. The intelligent interpreter must be
willing to look at prior legislation, regulatory action before the passage of
the language in question, earlier court decisions using the same words,
and even industry arguments over the implications of particular choices
of meaning. Thus, it is my bold assertion that the textualist would be lost
in trying to answer the particular question posed in this case study-common sense, dictionaries, and statutory context provide little guidance, and
I argue that it will often be so in disputes of this kind. Dig we must ....
I. BACKGROUND
At the center of this particular study of statutory meaning is a bitter
controversy among some members of Congress, the Federal Communications Commission, and industry groups over the meaning of several of the
most fundamental terms in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996
Act"). 4 More specifically, the dispute is over the meaning and scope of
two critical definitions in the legislation-"telecommunications" 5 and
"information service."'6 As we shall see, the disagreement concerns not
only the correct meaning of these two terms, but also their interrelationship-whether one category excludes the other. Far reaching regulatory,
legal, and financial consequences attend the resolution of the controversy. Moreover, some unusual techniques have been used in the battle.
A. THE

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Acr

OF

1996

First, it is necessary to understand the statutory context of this dispute.
The story begins with the enactment of the Communications Act of 1934
3. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); James J. Brudney, CongressionalCommentary on Judicial Inter-

pretationsof Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994); George
A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability
of Committee Reports, FloorDebates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE
L. J. 39; McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation,57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing
Statutes, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 627 (1987); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in ConstruingStatutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990).
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, PuB. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
5. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3(a)(2)(48), 47 U.S.C. § 153 (43) (Supp. III
1998).
6. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3(a)(2)(41), 47 U.S.C. § 153 (20) (Supp. III
1998).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

("1934 Act"), which created the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") and gave it power to regulate two quite different industries telephones and radio. 7 The 1934 Act was short and vague, an enabling
statute in the old style that gave the FCC very broad powers with little
substantive guidance, except
the famous "public interest, convenience,
8
and necessity" standard.
Over the years, the FCC's role changed drastically, especially as it
struggled to deal with radio (later joined by television and cable). The
FCC became the poster child for regulatory ineptitude in the difficult task
of selecting broadcast licensees, and it repeatedly clashed with the D.C.
Circuit over issues of substantive regulation. 9 Until the 1984 Cable Act, 10
Congress repeatedly ignored or rebuffed calls by the FCC and critics to
amend and update the 1934 Act to provide guidance on emerging issues
and technologies. The list is a long and sad one. In a whole succession of
problem areas, the FCC struggled without clear congressional direction,
often resulting in wasteful litigation, industry uncertainty, and regulatory
chaos. The FCC lacked clear authority, for example, to deal with direct
regulation of radio and television networks," and Congress failed to clarify its powers. Congress refused to clarify or codify the fairness doctrine,
12
despite its great importance to the industry, leaving the FCC on its own.
Further, it failed to amend the 1934 Act to deal with emerging technologies such as cable and microwave distribution of video signals, leaving the
13
Supreme Court to develop an awkward auxiliary jurisdiction theory.
Congress also allowed the FCC to stagger blindly into the area of competition in long-distance telephone service, even though the issue was of
surpassing importance and cried out for legislative guidance. 14 It forced
the FCC to create quasi-copyright rules for cable transmission of televi7. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1994).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (in general), § 307(a) (licenses) (1994).
9. See, e.g., Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (discussing EEO requirements on licensees); Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 398
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (examining ownership by women as licensing criterion); Bechtel v. FCC,
957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (integrating ownership and management as licensing
criterion); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (analyzing pay
cable restrictions); Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM. v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 263 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (discussing format controls).
10. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, PuB. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984).
11. See, e.g., NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
12. The FCC's fairness doctrine had two distinct parts: an obligation to affirmatively
cover important public issues, and an obligation to present contrasting points of view on
those issues the station did cover. It was first formalized in Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). The constitutionality of the fairness doctrine was upheld
by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
13. The Court reasoned that the FCC could regulate activities that were reasonably
necessary to carry out the core responsibilities of the Communications Act. Since cable
had a profound impact on broadcasting, for example, it could be regulated under this "ancillary jurisdiction" theory. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 181
(1968).
14. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the FCC allowed MCI and other new carriers to
provide private long distance service to businesses. MCI then started its Execunet service,
which resembled regular public long distance. The Court of Appeals rejected the Commis-
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sion signals, when an amendment to the 1934 Act or the Copyright Act
was certainly in order. 15 Again, its failure to act led to efforts by the
Supreme Court to legislate in the area, with disastrous results.' 6 Perhaps
most egregious of all, Congress refused to give the FCC any guidance in
its long and unsuccessful effort to give meaning to the public interest
17
standard in the context of licensing.
While Congress did finally act in the 1980s with regard to FCC jurisdiction over cable 18 and copyright liability,1 9 its general attitude toward the
key statutory issues in telecommunications law until the 1996 Act is one
of neglect.2 0 Perhaps its approach reflects the extreme sensitivity of regulating broadcasting, or an entrenched desire to leave discretion and policy
in the hands of the FCC. Whatever the cause, the hands-off attitude toward the FCC's organic statute changed in the early 1990s, and a long
period of legislative discussion culminated in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.
The 1996 Act amends the 1934 Act but is many times longer. Where
the 1934 Act was vague and vested broad discretionary powers in the
FCC, the 1996 Act is complex and specific, having something in common
sion's attempt to curtail the service in MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380
(D.C. Cir. 1977), and in the 1980s the FCC allowed full competition in long distance.
15. They included regulation of distant signal importation by cable companies, rules
restricting carriage of programming by cable companies that duplicated the programs of
local broadcasters, rules requiring the carriage of local stations, and requirements for ob-

taining retransmission consent from broadcasters. See generally, JOHN
FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW, § 10.6 (1995).

THORNE ET AL.,

16. The Court decided, unwisely in the view of most observers, that retransmission of
a television signal by a cable company did not constitute "performance" within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 413-15 n.15
(1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401 (1968).
17. In 1965, the FCC promulgated its own set of licensing standards, partly in answer
to outside criticism. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C. 2d 393
(1965). Courts and scholars were highly critical of its efforts over the years. After rejection of one of its principal comparative criteria in Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir.
1993), the FCC gave up the effort and suspended comparative hearings altogether. An
even more intractable problem was choosing a winner when one applicant was an existing
licensee and the other was a challenger. Reacting to signals from Congress and industry
outrage, the FCC promulgated a new policy favoring incumbents in 1970. Policy Statement
Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C. 2d
424 (1970). The D. C. Circuit, as usual, rejected the Commission's policy. Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F. 2d 1201, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The 1996 Act essentially
ends comparative hearings and enacts the 1970 Policy Statement into law. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 204, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (Supp. III 1998). More recently, Congress decreed
that nearly all licenses in the broadcast services must be auctioned. PUB. L. No. 105-33,
111 Stat. 251, § 3002(a)(3) (1997).
18. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, PuB. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976). The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Copyright
Act created a situation intolerable to the powerful broadcast industry, and Congress eventually settled on a compromise-a compulsory license for retransmission of broadcast signals by cable companies.
20. Since 1934, Congress has frequently used the hearing process to influence FCC
policy. Admittedly, the pressure of individual members on specific issues has often been
intense. Thus, the point here is not that Congress lacked interest in FCC policy, but only
that it rarely resorted to formal statutory clarification as a means of expressing its will.
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with the most complex environmental statute. The new act is an amalgam
of both regulation and deregulation, of both broad policy discretion and
direct regulation of bewildering complexity, of both technological updating and glaring missed opportunities.
The avowed purpose of the 1996 Act is to create a new de-regulatory
and pro-competitive paradigm in telecommunications. Its basic thrust is
to obliterate old protectionist regimes for local telephone and cable service, and to encourage new competition. The legislation envisages local
companies moving into long-distance, long-distance companies providing
local service, the creation of entirely new telephone competitors, local
companies entering the cable business, and the emergence of entirely new
kinds of cable competitors. At the same time, the 1996 Act contains new
and highly complex regulatory schemes-detailed rules on interconnection of new competitors with local telephone companies, 21 complicated
restrictions on local telephone companies' entry into long-distance, 22 and
four different regulatory options for telephone companies' entry into
23
cable.
The attitude toward the FCC embodied in the 1996 Act is decidedly
mixed. On the one hand, Congress dramatically reversed decades of indifference by mandating in detail certain new policy initiatives, leaving
the FCC only to implement them. Local interconnection is an example of
this attitude. On other, perhaps more politically sensitive issues, however, Congress left the FCC broad discretion, as in broadcast and cable
ownership rules.24 In some areas, like universal service, Congress made
some crucial policy decisions but at the same time left the FCC with a
very complex and loosely defined job of filling in the gaps.2 5 Because the
statute is so long and complicated, the FCC was left with a daunting task
of carrying out a large number of difficult rule making proceedings within
a very short time, an assignment that has stretched the Commission's
physical and intellectual resources. Now, for the first time in its history,
the FCC administers a long and complex statute, and has much of its
regulatory agenda set directly by Congress.
This is not the place to make an overall assessment of the quality of
Congress's handiwork in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Critics
have already begun to point out, however, that the Act was obsolete
21. 47 U.S.C. § 251, 252 (Supp. III 1998).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 271, 272 (Supp. III 1998).
23. 47 U.S.C. §3 571-73 (Supp. III 1998).
24. Broadcast ownership rules are embodied in FCC regulations, while cable rules are
found in statute, at 47 U.S.C. § 613 (c)-(f). Section 202 of the 1996 Act limits radio and TV
ownership both nationally and in each market, and gives the FCC the power to reconsider
and change them in section 202 (h).
25. The FCC may, for example, expand the definition of universal service itself, following general principles laid down in the statute. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (b)-(c) (Supp. III 1998).
It may expand Congress's definition of entities required to contribute to universal service
funding. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (Supp. III 1998). The FCC is also exhorted in the statute to
develop new rules to promote new advanced services for consumers. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(2)
(Supp. III 1998). Perhaps most important, the Act says nothing about costing rules for
universal service, leaving that sticky issue to the FCC.
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when it was passed, and that it failed to correctly predict where the combination of global business pressures and technological advances would
take the newly converging telecommunications industry. 26 Indeed, since
the 1996 Act was developed by House and Senate committees in 1994
and 1995, it almost completely failed to anticipate the Internet and the
impact that Internet-based telecommunications services would have on
this complex web of technological and industrial development. Therein
lie the seeds of the current controversy over the definitions of "telecommunications" and "information service."
B.

THE TRIGGERING ISSUES-UNIVERSAL
ADVANCED SERVICES

SERVICE AND

To understand this controversy, it is necessary to understand the background of two long-standing telecommunications issues-universal service and the deployment of advanced services. For it is the impact of the
1996 Act on these two issues that triggered the current dispute.
1. Universal Service
Universal service is simultaneously a corporate goal of the old Bell System, a social policy pursued by the FCC and state public utility commissions, and now a statutory goal of U.S. telecommunications law. 27 At the
most fundamental level, it is a simple concept-that all Americans should
have access to certain basic telephone services at affordable rates. It
stems not only from the desirability of speedy communications for all
households in an open democratic society, but also from the obvious economic benefit of having a telephone network that allows a caller to reach
any other resident of the country quickly and cheaply.
26. Despite Congress's desire and hope, for example, local telephone companies have
shown little interest in becoming head-to-head competitors with cable companies in delivering video programming. Therefore, cable companies are still largely monopolies. By the
same token, Congress believed that requiring telephone companies to open their local
markets to competition as a prerequisite to entering the lucrative long-distance market
would motivate them to cooperate with local competitors, but that hope too has been
largely unrealized. As of this writing, only one local company has qualified to enter the
long-distance market. Instead of competing against one another, the regional Bell operating companies have opted to merge, so as to better compete globally. AT&T, instead of
becoming an aggressive competitor for local phone service, has moved massively into cable
by acquiring TCI and Media One, choosing the cable route into the home rather than the
telephone line, This last strategy was not foreseen by the 1996 Act and creates a number of
new policy issues which are outside the scope of this Article. The fierce battle over "cable
access"-whether cable companies should be required to allow competing Internet service
providers direct access to cable modem platforms-raises serious statutory questions which
the 1996 Act simply cannot answer. The issue, though now of great importance, was not
anticipated or dealt with by the drafters. Indeed, it is not even clear whether Internet
access through a cable modem is a "cable service," an "information service" or a "telecommunications service" under the Act's definitions. Ultimately the federal courts may be
asked to resolve this far-reaching question of telecommunications policy.
27. See generally THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND
POLICY 348-52 (2d ed. 1998).
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Developed by the old unified Bell System, the modern concept of universal service responded to the fact that providing telephone service to
some potential subscribers was disproportionately expensive-running a
line to each home in rural areas, for example, is much more expensive
than running lines to those in high-density urban areas. By the same token, it is more expensive per call for low usage homes to have long-distance service than for high-usage businesses. Because the Bell System
owned and controlled the entire communications network, 28 however, it
possessed the means to keep rates low for basic residential service and for
home long-distance service by cross-subsidization. As long as overall
profits were satisfactory, it mattered little to the Bell System whether one
part of the system paid below-cost rates, as long as another paid abovecost rates. Thus was born, with explicit and implicit support from the
FCC and the state public utility commissions, a complicated system of
cross-subsidies designed to keep down residential rates and spur expansion of the telephone system. The principal subsidies were: business use
subsidizing residential, urban areas subsidizing rural, and long-distance
callers subsidizing local service.
For many years this system worked well, though it was invisible to most
consumers and lacked a statutory basis. The Bell System created the
cheapest and most efficient telephone system in the world, allowing penetration of telephones in the United States to reach a level of almost 94%
of all households. 29 Granted, the cross-subsidies created problems for the
Bell System in the government's antitrust case leading to the system's
breakup. Despite the complicity of state and federal regulators, the
cross-subsidies were viewed as anti-competitive and products of excessive
market power. 30 But while AT&T and the local Bell companies continued the same universal service policies after the system's breakup in 1984,
and the FCC in the 1980s created explicit funding mechanisms to stimulate phone hook-ups in low income areas, cracks began to appear in the
rickety system of subsidies.
A series of FCC decisions in the 1960s and 1970s brought competition
to the long-distance market. 31 And it soon became apparent that universal service subsidies and competition were incompatible in the long run.
28. By the 1950s, AT&T controlled 23 local Bell telephone companies, and owned
minority stakes in two others, Cincinnati Bell and Southern New England Telephone. It
also owned its own exclusive equipment manufacturing business, Western Electric, and a
formidable research arm, Bell Labs. While there were many small telephone companies
scattered around the country, some municipally owned, the only significant player was
GTE. In sum, the Bell System served over 80% of U.S. telephone customers.
29. See FALLING THROUGH THE NET: DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION B (July 1999).

30. See KRATIENMAKER, supra note 27, at 395-396; Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen,
The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation:United States v. AT&T, THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds. 1989); Glen 0. Robinson, The
Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 517 (1988).
31. See supra note 14.
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Since only established long-distance carriers paid into the universal service fund, and since long-distance rates embodied a built-in subsidy to
local rates, new carriers could afford to offer much lower long-distance
rates and still make a profit. While this advantage posed no immediate
threat to AT&T, it allowed MCI, Sprint, and other competitors to quickly
establish themselves by focusing on markets where AT&T's rates were
unnaturally high.
Universal service thus presented both a problem and an opportunity
for the drafters of comprehensive telecommunications reform legislation
in the 1990s. The old network of implicit subsidies could not possibly
survive the new regime of competition in local service. Incumbent carriers eventually would have to charge more cost-based rates or see their
competitors take away business because of the presence of implicit subsidies. So a new method of supporting universal service was necessary.
But this occasion for fundamental reform also presented the opportunity
to redefine and expand the concept of universal service, and throughout
the hearings on the new legislation there was much talk of expanding the
definition of universal service beyond the provision of basic servicesPlain Old Telephone Service ("POTS")-to a statutorily-based list of
services including emergency services, touch tone dialing, and eventually
Internet access. 32 In addition, a group of Senators envisaged a related
policy goal-to provide Internet access to schools, libraries, and rural
health care providers, expanding the concept of universal service still
33
further.
34
Thus was born Section 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
That section made explicit the goal of universal service, giving it a statutory basis for the first time. Congress defined universal service as an
evolving list of services, 35 and delegated power to a new Federal-State
Joint Board and to the FCC to define the term. 36 It further provided that
a wider group of entities would have to pay for the costs of universal
service-not just established long-distance carriers, but "[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services. . . ,,37 For the first time, cellular telephone and paging companies
and (by FCC addition) other wireless providers would broaden the revenue base for universal service. Absent from the list, as we shall see, are
Internet service providers, creating the seeds of the controversy that stimulates this Article. Finally, Section 254 contemplates that after an un32. See generally S. Hrg. 104-218, Hearing on Telecommunications Policy Reform,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 2, 1995) (Senate); Communications Law Reform, Ser. No.
104-34, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (May 10, 11, and 12, 1995) (House).
33. Backed publicly by Vice President Gore, Senators Snowe, Rockefeller, Kerrey,
Exon, and others successfully added the "E-rate" discount plan for schools, libraries, and
rural health care providers as Section 310 of the Senate bill, S.652. It survived the HouseSenate conference to become section 254(h) of the Communications Act.
34. Codified as 47 U.S.C. § 254 (Supp. III 1998).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 254(c) (Supp. III 1998).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (Supp. III 1998).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (Supp. III 1998).
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specified transition period, the current system of hidden subsidies will be
replaced with a new open and understandable system. 38 There will, in the
future, be no need to create non-cost-based pricing systems that are incompatible with a fully competitive telecommunications industry, and the
laudable national goals of universal service, expanded to include schools,
libraries, and rural health care providers, can still be realized.
2. Regulation of Advanced Services
The second background element necessary to understand the current
controversy is the thirty-year effort of the FCC to come to grips with the
computer age and to fashion a regulatory policy that incorporates advanced data processing into the traditional concepts of telecommunications. Unlike many other FCC policies over the years since 1934, its
efforts in this area have largely been well-considered and forwardlooking.
In sharp contrast to today's exciting and technologically sophisticated
telecommunications industry, the old-style telephone business was the
epitome of uninteresting, highly regulated stability. Transmission of voice
telephone messages was considered by all to be a classic "natural monopoly" and was regulated as such by the FCC, state commissions, and the
Justice Department (through consent decrees). The Bell System dominated American telephone communications, and was regulated under
common carrier principles developed for railroads. Key concepts included the primacy of filed rates (tariffs), requirements of open access by
customers and non-discrimination between them, and public utility style
cost-of-service ratemaking. 39 Telephone regulation was a sleepy legal
backwater, an accountant's game, in contrast to the more exciting world
of broadcasting. Though there was considerable antitrust activity aimed
at the Bell System in the 1950s and 1960s, 40 and the beginnings of competition in long-distance telephone service, the FCC's first foray into the
technological future came in the mid-1960s, when it began to see the potential of transmitting complex non-voice information over the public
switched telephone network operated chiefly by the Bell System.
The Commission initiated its first Computer Inquiry in 1966, at a time
when computers were giant centralized machines and companies used
their services largely through time sharing. Data processing services that
allowed interaction with data such as financial information were coming
on line, and of course, the data was made available to customers over
telephone lines. The Commission in its first Computer Inquiry attempted
to address two important questions-whether these new data processing
uses for the public switched telephone network should be regulated just
38. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5) (Supp. III 1998).

39. See generally

MICHAEL

K.

KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

ch. 2 (1992) [hereinafter KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW].
40. Id. at ch. 4. There were a number of private antitrust cases against AT&T, as well
as federal consent decrees issued in 1914 and 1956 aimed at anti-competitive practices.
LAW,
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as voice messages were, and whether the Bell companies should be allowed to offer such advanced telecommunications services themselves.
After a lengthy public proceeding involving all of the relevant industry
groups and outside experts, the FCC made a momentous decision in its
1971 Computer I decision 4 1-data processing services would develop in
an unregulated environment, but the participation of existing telephone
companies in these new businesses would be severely restricted. The issue was complicated, and the arguments over line-drawing are the same
ones being deployed today. In order to define regulated and unregulated
communications services under the Computer I structure, the Commission divided them into message switching (traditional voice telephone
service), data processing (services in which information could be accessed, modified, or manipulated by the user), and hybrid services (combining the two concepts). 42 Hybrid services were further divided into
those principally involving messaging with some incidental computing
(hybrid communications), and those principally involving data processing
with some incidental messaging (hybrid data processing). The first form
of hybrid service, hybrid communications, would be regulated like messaging. The second, hybrid data processing, would be exempted from regulation like full-fledged data processing. 43 The FCC's refusal to regulate
data processing services under the Act was later upheld by the federal
4
courts on review of Computer L 4
In its 1970 and 1971 Computer I opinions, the FCC supported its regulatory decisions by arguing that the emerging computer industry was
highly competitive, and that common carrier regulation under Title II
might stifle innovation and retard the availability of new services (then
only dimly perceived). It left open the possibility that it could impose
some regulation under its ancillary jurisdiction theory should it become
necessary. 4 5 The Commission then decided to allow existing local telephone companies, because they were still monopolies, only highly restricted access to competitive businesses like data processing, lest they
46
abuse their bottleneck power.
By the time the FCC returned to these issues in 1976, the computer
industry was changing rapidly. Soon the centralized large computer
would give way to the decentralized PC environment, and the types of
different data processing applications available multiplied rapidly-sports
scores, stock quotes, alarm monitoring, electronic publishing, voice answering services, and many others. In its Second Computer Inquiry, the
FCC was forced to revisit its crucial line-drawing, while keeping in place
41. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities (Computer 1), 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (Tentative Decision); 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (Final Decision).
42. See Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C. 2d at 15.
43. See id. at $ 39-42.
44. See GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 736 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. See Computer I Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C. 2d at 23.
46. See id. at 36.
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the deregulatory thrust of its original decision. In the Computer H decision, released in 1980, 47 the FCC admitted that its attempt to sub-divide
hybrid services into two categories based on whether simple message
transmission or data processing predominated in the particular service
was doomed to fail. The combinations were infinite, and the required
distinctions were bogging down both the Commission and the industry.
So the FCC, with strong industry support, made its second momentous
decision, which formed the basis for the current controversy. It abandoned the hybrid services category altogether, and divided all communications services into just two categories-basic and enhanced. "Basic"
services were defined as the core of the public switched telephone network traditionally subject to regulation, the "common carrier offering of
transmission capacity for the movement of information. 48 Only the path
was provided, with no control over the data transmitted. An "enhanced"
service, by contrast, was "any offering over the telecommunications network which is more than a basic transmission service. ' 49 The Commission emphasized that it classed any service that involved acting on the
content, code, protocol, or other aspects of the customer's information, or
even just the ability to interact with it, as "enhanced." This "contamination" concept-that any enhancement added to basic pipeline transmission function took the service out of the basic and into the enhanced
category-became the cornerstone of the FCC's approach to advanced
data processing services. The contamination idea recognized that all enhanced services have a basic transmission component, and even acknowledged that some enhanced services are very similar to regulated basic
services. But the FCC argued that its regime was the only logical or legally defensible approach.
On the legal side, the Commission argued that its core regulatory authority under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 extended only
to common carriers. 50 Though the term "common carrier" was not then
(and is not now) actually defined in the 1934 Act, courts had developed
over the years a pretty clear working definition. Common carrier services
were those offered on the same terms to everyone, and provided no opportunity for the carrier to change the content of the information. 5 ' In
other words, common carriers offered pure transmission capacity. In the
Commission's view, the new data processing services were quite different.
47. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Computer I), 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 386 (1980) (Final Decision).
48. Id. at. 93-96.
49. Id. at 97. The FCC later adopted a formal definition of "enhanced services" "services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content,
code, protocol, or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1998).
50. See Computer H Final Decision, at 122.
51. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (NARUC I), 533 F.2d 601, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (NARUC II).
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Companies offering them provided tailored services to each customer and
had the power to act on the content and form of the customer's data to
create more sophisticated information. Regulation of data processing,
the FCC argued, might well take it beyond the authority over common
carrier services in the 1934 Act.5 2 Even if the Commission could regulate
these services under some ancillary jurisdiction theory, as necessary for
comprehensive regulation of telephone companies, the FCC asserted the
53
power to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction in the public interest.
On the policy side, the FCC reiterated its view from Computer I that
the data processing business was highly competitive and needed no regulation. Forbearance, in its view, was necessary in order to unleash the
highly innovative and fast changing computer industry. Moreover, its
new framework had the added advantage of being simple, providing more
certainty and predictability for the industry.
Computer I was upheld in all important respects by the D.C. Circuit in
1982. 54 Critically for our story, the court upheld the FCC's legal conclusion that data processing did not meet the established definition of common carrier services, and that the FCC could55 decline to exercise its
ancillary jurisdiction (even assuming it existed).
Complicating this development of a regulatory theory for computer
services is the parallel antitrust case against AT&T, culminating in the
1982 settlement that broke up the Bell System. The Modification of Final
Judgment ("MFJ") 56 that ended the case allowed AT&T, which was to be
separated from the regional Bell Operating Companies, into the data
processing business with restrictions. It prohibited the twenty-three operating companies, soon to be combined into seven regional companies,
from themselves engaging in data processing businesses, since they were
thought to be natural monopolies in their service areas and therefore to
exercise potential monopoly control over computer services on their networks. As illustrated in some detail below, the MFJ adopted definitions
of telecommunications and information services that were substantively
similar to those used by the FCC in its computer inquiries. In the administration of the consent decree over the next fourteen years, Judge
Greene applied the same conceptual framework-data processing was to
remain unregulated, and advanced data processing services were defined
as essentially anything other than basic transmission service. 57 The local
telephone companies' participation in advanced services was still viewed
with great skepticism, an attitude that probably hindered the develop52. See Computer H Final Decision, at 123.
53. See id. at 124-27.
54. See Computer and Communication Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 220 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 461 U.S. 938
(1983).
55. See id. at 209-14.
56. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
57. See infra Section III (G).
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ment of sophisticated new telephone services. 58 Eventually the restriction was lifted, allowing the local companies to offer data processing
59
through separate corporate affiliates.
II.

THE DEFINITIONS ISSUE EMERGES

This section will explore the regulatory actions, industry changes, and
technological advances that, in combination with the provisions of the
1996 Act, brought on the current controversy concerning the meaning
and scope of the terms "telecommunications" and "information service."
A.

TECHNOLOGICAL AND BUSINESS CONVERGENCE

As the Federal Communications Commission began the long and difficult process of implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the
two years following its enactment, it became obvious that the pace of
technological change was deeply affecting both the overall structure of
the 1996 Act and the specific regulatory strategies embodied in it. Many
of these changes were well underway in 1995 when the legislation was
taking shape, though their most far-reaching implications were not clearly
seen by its drafters. These technological changes are now universally referred to by the shorthand term "convergence. ' 60 Convergence has many
meanings, but its thrust is clear. All telecommunications content is increasingly being delivered by digital means, as a stream of zeroes and
ones, instead of the old analog method. This convergence of transmission
method is making possible other kinds of convergence. Voice, video, and
data may now all be transmitted by the same means and are therefore
increasingly interchangeable. This change is also transforming the telecommunications businesses formerly conceived as inhabiting different
worlds. Cable companies can deliver telephone service and Internet access, telephone companies can provide Internet access, and it is possible
to listen to radio stations and watch television on a home computer via
the Internet, to mention just a few. Companies like Microsoft, NBC,
AT&T, SBC, and Time-Warner increasingly see themselves as being in a
variety of telecommunications businesses at the same time. Eventually,
convergence may result in a home device that is a combination of a personal computer, telephone, fax machine, and television set. In such a
world, the business competition will be among competing producers of
58. Ironically, as Kellogg, Thorne and Huber have pointed out, the antitrust case developed against the Bell system contained very little actual evidence on enhanced services
abuses or competitive dangers. See KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW,

supra note 39, at 316-17.
59. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 333 (D.D.C. 1991).
60. See generally Andrew C. Barrett, Symposium on Convergence in Telecommunications, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 987 (1996); Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological
Change and DoctrinalPersistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 976 (1997); Francis Cairncross, A Connected World, THE ECONOMIST,

Sept. 13, 1997, at S3.
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"content" for such a device, and among competing lines into the home by
which to connect the device to the wider world.
A prime example of a "convergence" technology arising largely after
the passage of the 1996 Act is Internet telephony. Though the drafters of
the legislation were aware of the Internet, and indeed included a provision encouraging development of the Internet in an unregulated environment,6 1 there is nothing in the extensive legislative history to indicate that
they were aware of the new phenomenon of Internet telephony. 62 For
some time Internet users both possessing the same software have been
able to communicate by voice. Only beginning in 1997 and 1998, however, was there serious consideration of telephone service using regular
home telephone instruments that could be delivered via the Internet. By
1999, many argued that Internet telephony had the potential to supplant
63
a good deal of traditional telephone service within the next ten years.
Not surprisingly, this new technological marvel does not fit well into the
regulatory scheme of the 1996 Act. Is it "telecommunications" like the
POTS it resembles, and thus regulated under Title II? Or is it an Internet
service, classed as "information service" under the Act and thus not regulated at all? These questions, as we shall see, are not just academic ones,
since the proper classification of Internet telephony and other advanced
services profoundly affects the FCC, universal service policies, the competitive balance between telephone and Internet companies, and the
profit margins of some key corporate players.

B.

CARRYING OUT THE

1996 Acr-TI-m FCC's

REGULATORY

REVOLUTION

Implementing the 1996 Act was, and is, an enterprise of enormous

scale. The FCC is statutorily required to carry out a number of complex
rule makings, some with short deadlines, and has initiated numerous
others on its own.64 The changes required by the broadcast and cable

portions of the new legislation are relatively modest, but those required
by changes to Title II are daunting indeed. The local telephone business

must essentially be transformed from monopoly to competition, and a
number of new approaches to regulation must be implemented under the
61. The provision is part of the Online Family Empowerment Act, added on the floor
of the House, and codified as 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (Supp. III 1998).
62. Earl Comstock, one of the principal staff drafters of the 1996 Act, maintained in
conversations with the author that the staff members involved knew about and discussed
such advanced phenomena as Internet telephony during the formation of the 1996 Act.
The subject did not surface, however, during the extensive hearings in both houses.
63. There was extensive discussion about the future of Internet telephony during the
FCC's en banc hearing on February 19, 1998, held in conjunction with its Report to Congress on Universal Service. For excellent surveys of future competition in telephone services, including Internet telephony, see Telecommunications-Bypassingthe Bells, WALL ST.
J., September 21, 1998; Review of Information Technology, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 7,
1998.
64. The FCC has placed on its web site a chart listing hundreds of pending and completed actions taken in implementation of the 1996 Act. It is divided into 27 different
subject areas and contains hundreds of discrete regulatory actions.
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intense scrutiny of industry groups and the states. The turf concerns are
many, and all parties are prepared for costly and prolonged litigation to
protect their interests.
The Commission's immediate implementation task under the Title II
amendments in the 1996 Act involved three major areas-interconnection, access reform, and universal service. The FCC first tackled interconnection and finished its initial rules in late 1996.65 Its decision,
elaborating the statutory ground rules for competition in local telephone
service, raised a host of thorny legal and policy issues. The order was
immediately challenged by a large group of industry and state PUC parties, and the FCC's position was largely vindicated by the Supreme Court
in late 1998.66 These rules for the most part did not touch on the difficult
issue of the relationship between the definitions of telecommunications
and information services, and so are not directly relevant to our story.
The two other major areas of FCC rulemaking in the initial implementing stages, however, directly bear on the definitional controversy. The
Commission conducted the rulemakings on access charges and universal
service in tandem, and promulgated both decisions on the same day in
May 1997.67 Each was a major undertaking. Over 200,000 pages of comments were filed by a bewildering array of parties-states, state regulatory agencies, federal agencies, schools and school associations,
universities, libraries, non-profit public interest groups, and of course
many corporations and industry trade groups. They addressed every conceivable issue raised by the difficult universal service controversy.
The access reform proceeding addressed head-on a series of the most
obvious cross-subsidy mechanisms that the 1996 Act aimed to eliminate.
They included the large access charges paid by long-distance carriers to
interconnect with local phone companies, which are not cost-based and
eventually must be eliminated or drastically overhauled. There are other
access charges as well, all of them means of shifting revenues. Even assuming that the existing system is illogical and costly, however, some sort
of access charge paid by computer services companies that use the local
phone company's network of wires and switches to provide a service to
customers makes sense. In this proceeding the FCC made a start toward
eventually revamping this complex system, but left most of the traditional
access charges in place for the moment lest the rates of residential subscribers be adversely affected. Most crucial for our discussion, it reiterated its Computer H decision that providers of data processing services
65. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996) (First Report and Order).
66. As usual, the FCC's rules were savaged by the Court of Appeals but generally
upheld in the Supreme Court. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997);
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
67. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997) (Report and Order) [hereinafter Universal Service Order]; Access Charge Reform, Price Cap
Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Transport Rate Structure and Pricing,
and End User Common Line Charges, 12 F.C.C.R.15982 (1997) (First Report and Order)
[hereinafter Access Charge Reform Order].
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were end-users like individual home subscribers or businesses. 68 Since
they were not analogous to interconnecting telecommunications companies, they paid no special access charges. In its discussion of these issues,
regime of
the Commission expressed the view that the new definitional
69
regime.
H
Computer
its
as
same
the
the 1996 Act was
The Universal Service Report and Order, our main focus, is over 500
pages long, and was preceded by a recommended decision of the FederalState Joint Board on Universal Service that was the same length. 70 The
FCC's order addresses all of the goals for the nebulous concept of universal service, many of them conflicting, that Congress articulated in Section
254 of the 1996 Act. Among them are eventual replacement of implicit
subsidies as a means of funding universal service with an open and understandable system of taxation; implementing a broader base of corporate
contributors to universal service; providing sufficient funding for support
of telephone service to rural and high-cost areas; finding new funding for
expanded support for schools, libraries, and rural health care providers;
achieving equity and competitive neutrality among both contributors and
recipients of funding; and protecting the consumer from increased prices
for telephone service. 71 Many of the FCC's specific decisions are outside
the scope of this Article, but they have provoked outcries from every
quarter. Among the most controversial were the Commission's decision
to create two quasi-public companies to administer the rural and school
portions of the fund, its inclusion of both local and state revenues in the
base for computing the amount an interstate telecommunications company will pay into the fund, the funding levels chosen and their effect on
rates, its decision to allow schools and libraries to receive funding for
backbone Internet access, and its choice of a forward-looking proxy cost
model to determine contributions and support levels. These and other
Circuit
issues were the subject of a judicial review proceeding in the Fifth
72
rules.
service
universal
Commission's
the
that generally upheld
In a decision that brought about the present controversy, the FCC determined that it would not require Internet service providers or any other
providers of "information services and enhanced services" to contribute
to the universal service fund. 73 Though some commenters argued that
ISPs should be required to contribute, on the theory that they competed
with traditional telephone companies, the FCC ruled that the definitional
sections of the 1996 Act did not permit such a conclusion. The Commis68. See Access Charge Reform Order, supra note 67, at 341-44.
69. See id. at n.498. The FCC's Access Charge Reform Order was upheld on review
by the Court of Appeals, which did not discuss the definitions question. See Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998).
70. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 87 (1996) (Recommended Decision).
71. See Universal Service Order,supra note 67, at 7-9.
72. See Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 410-12 (5th Cir. 1999).
The Court of Appeals had no occasion to discuss the questions of statutory interpretation
discussed in this article.
73. Universal Service Order, supra note 67, at 788.
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sion reasoned that while Internet access and similar advanced services
were delivered by telephone wires, they were "enhanced" not "basic"
services under its Computer H framework. 74 It then went on to rule that
the terms "enhanced services" used by the FCC and "information services" used in the 1996 Act were "substantially similar. 7 5 It further asserted that the regulatory regime it had been operating under since
Computer /--broadly defining information services as anything other
than pure common carrier pipeline service and deregulating themwould continue under the 1996 Act. Therefore, since ISPs and similar
companies, including those who might deliver Internet telephony, were
not engaged in "telecommunications" they could not be required to con76
tribute to universal service funding under section 254 of the Act.
Foreshadowing the future controversy with Senator Stevens, the Commission noted in this crucial portion of its opinion that it had met with the
Senator's staff on these questions. 77 It also noted that "the office of Senator Stevens" and a few other commenters had argued strenuously that
"information services are inherently telecommunications services because
information services are offered via 'telecommunications.' ' 78 The opinion explained that since Internet services alter the form and content of
the customer's information, they cannot be "telecommunications" under
the Act's definition. They must be information services. Repeating the
policy arguments made in Computer II, the Commissioners noted that
Senator Stevens's position would result in the imposition of Title II common carrier regulation on ISPs and other providers of advanced data
processing services. This result is not only unwise, but also counter to the
deregulatory thrust of the 1996 Act.
The implications of the FCC's disposition of this issue and its interpretation of "information service" and "telecommunications" under the Act
are far-reaching. As critics quickly pointed out, ISPs would have a competitive cost advantage against local telephone companies entering the
Internet access business because ISPs would not pay access charges or
contribute to universal service funding. The Commission also created another competitive asymmetry by ruling that ISPs could receive support
from the universal service fund for providing certain services to schools
and libraries, even though they were not required to make contributions.
Finally, for the moment the FCC's position meant that providers of the
new Internet telephone service, even if it was substantially similar to
traditional service in the eye of the consumer, would not contribute to
universal service funding or pay access charges for the use of the local
74. Id. at 1 789, n.2023.
75. Id. at 788. The Commission had earlier held that the two sets of definitions were
substantially similar in its proceeding to implement the sections of the 1996 Act dealing
with entry by local telephone companies into the long-distance market. See Implementation of the Non-Accounting Standards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905, at 99-102 (1996) (First Report and Order).
76. Universal Service Order, supra note 67, at 788.
77. See id. at 789 n.2022.
78. Id.
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phone network, unlike other long-distance telephone companies. 79 This
cost advantage might accelerate the growth of Internet telephony and seriously threaten the hitherto impregnable position of the incumbent Bell
companies as providers of telephone service.
C.

CONGRESSIONAL REACTION AND SECTION

623

The FCC's May 1997 Universal Service Order, along with the earlier
Non-Accounting Standards Order and follow-up decisions on universal
service, set off a loud debate with its critics. 80 Telephone companies complained that Internet companies were given a competitive advantage by
being excluded from the contribution base for universal service, but at
the same time were allowed to receive payments for providing access to
schools, libraries, and rural health care providers under Section 254(h).
This so-called E-rate program, estimated to involve up to $2.5 billion per
year, was controversial in other ways. Because it was closely identified
with Vice President Gore and the Clinton Administration's "information
highway" rhetoric, it came under general attack from some Republicans,
who referred to it as the "Gore Tax."'' s At the same time, Senator Stevens
and other congressional critics from western states were concerned that
the new focus on schools and libraries would undermine funding for rural
and high-cost telephone service that had always been the core focus of
universal service policies. 82 Still others, including some FCC commissioners, criticized the total amount of universal service funding on the
grounds that it made it more difficult to reduce telephone service rates to
consumers and businesses. 83 In effect, they argued, the promise of lower
rates through elimination of non-cost-based access charges would be
79. Later, in its Report to Congress, the FCC noted that phone-to-phone Internet telephony may well be indistinguishable from regular telephone service to the consumer, and
if so, might have to be classified as a telecommunications service. It declined to definitively
rule on this question, however, preferring to wait for a more developed record. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501 §§ 88-91 (1998) [hereinafter
Report to Congress].
80. See infra note 120 (sources cited).
81. See, e.g., from just one week in 1998, Penny Bender, Critics Complain "Gore Tax"
Is Bureaucracy Run Amok; Telephone Users Footing Bill ForInternet in Schools, THE TENNESSEAN, May 13, 1998, at IA; AT&T to Pass Internet Costs to Callers, WASH. POST, May
28, 1998, at C4; Mike Mills, Consumer Groups Balk at School Internet Hookup Plan, THE
WASHINGTON POST, May 26, 1998, at Dl; Karen Tumulty & John F. Dickerson, Gore's
Costly High-Wire Act, TIME, May 25, 1998, at 52.
82. See Senators Eye July Action for New USF Assault, COMM. TODAY, June 26, 1998.
83. From the beginning, Commissioner Furchgott-Roth has been a vociferous opponent of the FCC's universal service policies, and especially its E-rate funding decisions.
Commissioner Powell has raised concerns about the levels of funding for the E-rate program and the secondary priority given to rural and high-cost support. Both are Republican
members. See, e.g., Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, FCC 99-121 (May 28,
1999) (Twelfth Report and Order on Reconsideration) (funding levels for E-rate) (Statement of Commissioner Furchgott-Roth dissenting) (statement of Commissioner Powell
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Report in Response to Senate Bill 1768 and Conference Report on H.R. 3579, 13 F.C.C.R. 11810 (1998) (dissenting statement of Commissioner Harold Furchgott-Roth) (separate statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell
dissenting).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

thwarted by offsetting larger payments to the universal service fund, and
one of the main goals of the 1996 Act would be frustrated.
To make the Commission's life even more difficult, some telephone
companies began showing universal service charges separately on their
bills, making it look like a new telecommunications tax. This action
caused individual consumers to write to their representatives in
Congress. 84
Finally, the Commission's decision to create a separate Schools and Libraries Corporation to collect and distribute E-rate funds came under
both legal and political attack. The GAO and congressional critics questioned the Commission's power to create a separate corporation for this
purpose, and also feared that the separate structure was intended to favor
85
this part of the universal service program.
Faced with these concerns, congressional critics, led by Senator Ted
Stevens of Alaska, had several options. They could rely on public and
private criticism of the FCC, in the time-honored tradition of jawboning,
hoping that the commissioners would weaken and modify the universal
service system. They also could attempt to enact amendments to the
1996 Act to force changes. These amendments might have included specific modifications of the definitions of "telecommunications" and "information service" to bring about the inclusion of ISPs in universal service.
They might also have included new provisions to deal with the regulatory
status of Internet telephony. Conversations with key staffers for Senator
Stevens confirm, however, that Senators had no desire to amend the 1996
Act so soon after its passage. In any case, there was no congressional
consensus on the issues of concern to Stevens and his allies.86 After the
Universal Service Order was adopted in May 1997, the departure of the
FCC's strong chairman and three other commissioners raised some hope
that the agency might reconsider these policy decisions.
There is little documentation of this period of informal jockeying, but
Senator Stevens's strategy is discernable from telecommunications trade
press reports and discussion with Hill staffers. He began talking publicly
about holding up the pending nominations of William Kennard as Chairman and three others as new FCC members until his concerns about uni84. See, e.g., Ted Bridis, AT&T to Add 93-cent Monthly Fee to Bills, SAN DIEGO
July 19, 1998, at C-2; Mark Genrich, McCain Has the FCC's Number on
Internet-Related Phone Fees, ARIz. REPUBLIC, June 17, 1998, at B6; Mark P. Couch, Phone
Customers Objecting to Universal Service Fees, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 29,
1998, at 21. The FCC and the telephone companies have continued to bicker over the
correct way to show universal service contributions on customers' bills.
85. No administrative structure for universal service was set out in the 1996 Act. A
General Accounting Office report dated February 10, 1998 (B-278820) criticized the program broadly and particularly argued against the separate Schools and Libraries Corporation. Congress demanded that the FCC make a formal report proposing changes. See
H.R. No. 3579, 105 Cong. (1998) (Conference Report language), H.R. No. 105-504. The
Commission responded with a Report, making changes in reaction to its critics. Report in
Response to Senate Bill 1768 and Conference Report on H.R. 3579, supra note 83.
86. Telephone conversation with Earl Comstock, principal telecommunications staff
member to Senator Stevens in 1998, June 1999.
UNION-TRIB.,
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versal service were addressed. 87 This, of course, would have crippled the
Commission and delayed any implementation of the 1996 Act. Senators
Stevens and Burns in fact held up the nominations for a time, doubtless
while behind-the-scenes negotiations took place. The trade press also
mentions that Senator Stevens was suggesting a new statutory provision.88 The new provision took a different tack from that of amending
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and instead called for a formal FCC
report on various controversial issues, including universal service.
The FCC nominations did go through later in October 1997.89 As the
controversy swirled, however, Senator Stevens apparently used his considerable clout as ranking member of the Commerce Committee, which
supervised the FCC and had drafted the 1996 Act, and his position as
Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, to persuade the
House-Senate Conference Committee on the Fiscal 1998 Appropriations
Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and
Related Agencies (including money for the FCC) in November 1997 to
include this novel reporting provision. Considering the whole history of
this episode, there is a strong hint that he was given this provision by the
conferees, in the time-honored tradition of the House and Senate, for
withdrawing his opposition to the FCC nominees. 90 The Appropriations
Act provision reads as follows:
Sec. 623. Report on Universal Service Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996(a) The Federal Communications Commission shall undertake a review of the implementation by the Commission of the provisions of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-104) relating
to universal service. Such review shall be completed and submitted
to the Congress no later than April 10, 1998.
(b) The report required under subsection (a) shall provide a detailed
description of the extent to which the Commission interpretations
reviewed under paragraphs (1) through (5) are consistent with the
plain language of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et
87. See Panel Oks FCC Nominees; Stevens May Seek to Delay, NATIONAL JOURNAL'S
CONGRESS DAILY,

October 8, 1997; Stevens May "Object" to Votes on FCC Nominees,

COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, October 8, 1997.

88. See Communications Daily Notebook, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 24, 1997.
89. 143 CONG. REC. S11,312 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1997).
90. Those familiar with the workings of the Senate know that its tradition of action by
consensus and the phenomenon of the "hold" on nominations and legislation make it possible for a Senator to obtain a provision he or she desires on an unrelated bill by this
means. It is much more difficult to translate a hold into a provision in a Conference Report, however, since assent by the House in advance would also be necessary. Given Senator Stevens's powerful position, and the relatively harmless "report" requirement he was
holding out for, it may well be that clearance was also obtained from the key members of
the House for what became Section 623. House leaders hold their noses about such deals,
because House rules are much stricter on the question of inserting unrelated matter into
appropriations bills. House traditions on not inserting new matter in conference are like-

wise stronger than those in the Senate. Nonetheless, by a process now lost in the legislative
mists, Section 623 magically appeared in the bill as finally enacted.
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seq.), as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and shall
include a review of(1) the definitions of "information service," "local exchange carrier," "telecommunications carrier," and "telephone exchange service" that were added to section 3 of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. 153) by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the
impact of the Commission's interpretation of those definitions on the
current and future provision of universal service to consumers in all
areas of the nation, including high cost and rural areas;
(2) the application of those definitions to mixed or hybrid services
and the impact of such application on universal service definitions
and support, and the consistency of the Commission's application of
those definitions, including with respect to Internet access under section 254(h) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 154(h));
(3) who is required to contribute to universal service under section
254(d) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 254(d)) and
related existing federal universal service support mechanisms, and of
any exemption of providers or exclusion of any service that includes
telecommunications from such requirement or support mechanisms;
(4) who is eligible under sections 254(e), 254(h)(1), and 254(h)(2)
of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 254(e), 254(h)(1), and
254(h)(2) to receive specific federal universal service support for the
provision of universal service, and the consistency with which the
Commission has interpreted each of those provisions of section 254;
and
(5) the Commission's decisions regarding the percentage of universal service support provided by federal mechanisms and the revenue base from which such support is derived. 9 '
Section 623 is arguably the most interesting aspect of the current case
study. On its face, it only requires the FCC to report to Congress on
several regulatory issues that were causing controversy-the funding
levels of universal service, the status of "hybrid" services like Internet
access, and decisions about who must contribute and who can obtain
funding support. The unique feature of this section, however, is its requirement that the FCC justify its interpretations of the 1996 Act and
defend their consistency with "the plain language" of the Telecommunications Act. The FCC is specifically directed to justify its interpretations
of "telecommunications," "information service," and other terms derived
from those two, and to show their impact on the goals of universal service. The tone of the provision strongly suggests that Congress considers
the FCC to be on the wrong track, and that its current interpretations of
the statutory definitions are incorrect. Expressed as part of a duly enacted statute, these suggestions carry far more weight than similar views
articulated by a powerful legislator alone. They surely carry more weight
91. Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1998, PuB. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2521-22, Sec. 623.
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than the views of certain members of a congressional committee expressed in a committee report. As we shall discuss more fully below, Section 623, particularly subsections (1) and (2), represents part of an
extraordinary dialogue between Congress and the FCC about the meaning of a statute, and an effort by Congress to influence the agency's interpretive process as it carries out the Telecommunications Act. It has no
counterpart, at least insofar as diligent research could confirm, in any
other statute. 92
Discussions with the key staff member who worked on Section 623 for
Senator Stevens confirm its purpose. 93 Given the changes on the Commission and the controversy over its Universal Service Order, there was
some hope that the FCC would actually change its mind on such key issues as the separateness of the categories "telecommunications" and "information service." More realistically, Senator Stevens and his staff
wanted to force the FCC to fully articulate its interpretations and to justify them, in the hopes that critics might eventually prevail as the flaws in
the FCC's arguments were exposed. It is apparent that Senator Stevens
was motivated by a genuine belief that the Commission's E-rate plan, its
exemption of all ISP services from universal service funding, as well as its
overall funding decisions, would profoundly weaken public support for
universal service, ultimately harming his constituents in rural and highcost Alaska. Moreover, he and his key staff experts believed that leaving
Internet service providers outside the funding system would, given the
projected growth of Internet telephony and other new services, slowly
erode the funding base of universal service to the detriment of all
Americans.
D. FCC RESPONSE TO SECTION 623
Most scholars and practicing lawyers think of statutory interpretation
as a process engaged in principally by judges and their law clerks, with
help from traditional legal briefs filed by the parties. Increasingly, however, we have come to realize that much statutory interpretation takes
place within administrative agencies, as the Supreme Court eventually
recognized in Chevron.94 Little attention has been given to the process
by which administrative agencies go about this interpretive function. In
the case of the FCC, it is relatively common for the Commission to ask
for comments on the meaning and scope of statutory terms as part of its
normal rulemaking process under Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 95 Presumably, the FCC then considers the legal arguments
92. But see infra note 218.
93. Conversation with Earl Comstock, June 1999.
94. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
95. For example, the FCC asked commenting parties to help with its interpretation of
the ownership provisions of the 1996 Act, and discussed their views in its recent order. See
Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, MM Docket No. 91-221,
Report and Order released August 6, 1999. 1999 WL 591756 (F.C.C.). Likewise the FCC
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of outside parties along with the analysis of its own staff in making its
interpretation of statutory terms. Courts under Chevron have generally
not commented on the fact that the agency in question solicited outside
help in making its statutory interpretation. Here, the FCC followed a
much more complex, and perhaps even unique, process to deal with a
difficult problem of statutory meaning.
In enacting Section 623, Congress did not specify any particular procedural requirements for the FCC to follow in formulating its "Report to
Congress." Indeed, similar reporting requirements have in recent decades become a common congressional tool for forcing the Executive
Branch to articulate its position or for sidestepping a controversial issue.
The whole subject of congressionally mandated reports as a species of
legislative activity is an interesting one, lightly considered but beyond the
scope of this Article. Though the FCC might have simply conferred with
its own lawyers and policy staff and written its "Report" without outside
consultation, it decided upon a very different course, creating a unique
and multi-faceted dialogue focused in important part on statutory
interpretation.
The FCC decided, after the enactment of Section 623 in November
1997, to follow Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act and use
a notice and comment process. While not strictly rule-making, since it did
not focus on the adoption of a legislative rule in APA terms, the process
is the same. 96 The FCC promulgated a public notice on January 5, 1998,
requesting public comments on the questions listed in Section 623 and
reprinting the text of the statutory provision. For convenience and clarity, the request for comments was made a part of Common Carrier Bureau Docket Number 96-45, the universal service rulemaking proceeding
for which literally hundreds of thousands of pages of comments had already been received. In its eventual report, the Commission characterized the subsequent process as follows:
We are mindful that the proper implementation of these provisions is
critical to the success and survival of the nation's universal service
system and, accordingly, have taken our obligations very seriously.
In preparing this Report, we have sought and reviewed thousands of
pages of public comments. We have considered more than 5,000 informal public comments filed via electronic mail. We have held two
en banc hearings during which panels of experts - including representatives of the Internet community, telecommunications compahas turned to outside parties to help it determine whether digital subscriber lines and other
advanced telecommunications services are subject to the compulsory interconnection requirements of section 251 of the 1996 Act. The FCC asked the Court of Appeals for a
remand in order to consider further the difficult statutory interpretation problems raised.
On September 9, 1999, the Commission requested public comment on, among other things,
whether these advanced services were "telephone exchange service" or "exchange access"
under the definition scheme of the 1996 Act. FCC release DA 99-1853.
96. Section 551(5) of the APA defines rule making as the process for formulating,
amending or repealing a rule. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1994). The FCC often uses the informal
notice and comment procedures of Section 553 for other kinds of policy making proceedings such as a Notice of Inquiry.
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nies, educators and state officials - discussed their views with us
concerning the interpretive issues surrounding the relevant provisions of the 1996 Act. Although many of the rules at issue have been
in place for nearly a year, we have considered each rule and interpretation anew and without preconceptions, in light
of both the plain
97
language and overall purposes of the 1996 Act.
Internally, the FCC formed an inter-office task force to work on the
report, which had to be written in a very short period under the terms of
Section 623. It included key staffers from the Common Carrier Bureau,
the Office of Plans and Policy and other offices, and a law professor in
residence at the FCC.98 The FCC specified that all ex parte contacts with
Commissioners or staff members be reported in the docket. Thus, we
know that extensive informal consultation went on between interested
parties and staff members as the Report was prepared. A round of reply
comments was added to help sharpen the issues.
The truly unusual aspect of this proceeding was the formal participation of congressional parties in the process. After enacting the statute
and calling for the FCC to formally interpret it in accordance with its
wishes, members of Congress then became directly involved in helping
the FCC arrive at its interpretations. Senators Stevens and Bums submitted a letter in response to the January 5th call for public comments, which
became the centerpiece of the discussion over definitions. This letter was
not simply a routine communication from two Senators. Ted Stevens of
Alaska was the most senior member of the Senate Commerce Committee, which oversees the FCC. He was then Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and later became Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee. By any definition, he was one of the four or five most powerful members of the Senate. Conrad Burns of Montana was Chairman
of the Communications Subcommittee of the Commerce Committee in
February 1998, and like Senator Stevens had been a member of that key
subcommittee during consideration of the 1996 Act. Moreover, Senator
Stevens had been a key participant in drafting the 1996 Act, and was the
author and sponsor of the Section 623 legislation that called for the Report to Congress. In addition, he was a key member of the Conference
Committee that had hammered out the final form of the 1996 Act.
Senators Stevens and Burns made several main points in their letter,
which the FCC and many other commentators focused on during the proceeding. The document is a mixture of legal and policy arguments. The
senators purported to speak for the entire Congress, not just for themselves, and to convey to the FCC the "correct" meaning of the definitions
of "telecommunications" and "information service" in the 1996 Act. 99
97. Report to Congress, supra note 79, at 11507.
98. Professor Jonathan Weinberg of Wayne State University Law School.
99. Letter from U.S. Senators Conrad Burns & Ted Stevens, to Hon. William E. Kennard, 1 (Jan. 26, 1998) (available in FCC Electronic Comment Filing System, Proceeding
96-45 <http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ecfs.html>) [hereinafter Stevens & Burns Letter]. Senator
Stevens published an extended version of his letter, but the timing of its publication did not
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Their principal policy concern was that by retaining the conceptual framework of Computer II, the FCC was undermining long-range support for
the Universal Service Fund, and thus support for rural and high-cost service areas such as those represented by Senators Stevens and Burns.' m
This was so because the Commission's construction of "information service" under its contamination theory meant that all Internet access services and Internet telephony delivered to the home would be ineligible for
support under universal service.10 1 They further argued that exempting
such core services as Internet access and e-mail from the definition of
"telecommunications" created a competitive anomaly: since these services did not pay access fees or universal service costs and since they were
unburdened by regulation, they possessed an unfair advantage over similar services offered by telephone companies. 10 2 The long-term result, argued Stevens, was that companies had an incentive to migrate
such
10 3
services onto the Internet, lowering universal service revenues.
The Senators' legal argument was more subtle. They contended that by
replacing the FCC categories of "basic" and "enhanced" services, Congress intended to abandon the FCC's conceptual framework altogether. 10 4 Indeed, the Stevens comments assert that the definitions of
"telecommunications" and "information service" were intended to be entirely new. l0 5 They were not meant to be mutually exclusive, as the FCC
had held "basic" and "enhanced" were, but rather were intended to overlap. 10 6 Certain information services also contained a telecommunications
component, and thus were also "telecommunications services" under the
Act.' 0 7 Because of this overlap in definitions, it was possible to categorize Internet access services and Internet telephony as "telecommunications.' 0 8 These services could thus be required to pay access and
universal service charges and would be eligible for future universal service subsidies, ensuring that even homes in rural and high-cost areas had
affordable Internet access. 10 9 The Stevens comments make detailed arguments about the legislative history, which we explore below, but the overall thrust is clear-the FCC missed the main point of the definitions in
the 1996 Act, and therefore distorted the entire modernizing thrust of the
legislation.
Many of the other parties did not focus on these definitional issues
raised by the Universal Service Report, but rather on the other controallow him to reply to the FCC's analysis in its Report to Congress. Sen. Ted Stevens, The
Internet and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 5, 6-8 (1998).
100. Stevens & Burns Letter, supra note 99, at 7.
101. Stevens & Burns Letter, supra note 99, at 10.
102. Id. at 8.

103. Id. at 9.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
See Stevens & Burns Letter, supra note 99, at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 10.
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versial matters listed in Section 623. By one count, thirty-four parties
commented on the definitions, of which twenty agreed with the FCC and
fourteen with Senator Stevens. It is not hard to guess the positions taken
by the corporate and trade association commenters. Internet and information service companies and trade groups generally supported the FCC
interpretation, stressing that allowing an overlap of the definitions of
"telecommunications" and "information service" would cause uncertainty and subject the Internet to Title II regulation, which Congress had
clearly wanted to avoid. To the extent that they addressed the legislative
history, these parties stressed the lack of Congressional expression of intent to overturn the FCC's conceptual framework and the origins of the
definitions themselves. 110 Telephone company commenters, on the other
hand, generally argued that it was unfair to exempt Internet access providers from paying universal service and access charges, even though their
services closely resembled traditional telecommunications services."'
They particularly stressed the anomaly of Internet telephony, which
would have a similar impact on the public switched telephone network as
compared with conventional long-distance service, but would not pay
comparable charges. Echoing Senators Stevens and Burns, these parties
argued that the FCC was clinging to outmoded concepts and that its
framework would be unable to cope with rapid technological change,
which was merging the concepts of basic and enhanced services. Their
legislative history arguments closely tracked those of Senators Stevens
and Burns.
A number of other parties took part in the proceeding, but most did
not focus particularly on the definitions question. These parties included
various states and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, an executive branch agency in the Department of
Commerce.
Other members of Congress also submitted comments on the definitional issues. Senator McCain, then Chairman of the Commerce Committee and one of the crucial players in the enactment of the 1996 Act,
submitted comments supporting the FCC's position and rejecting the legislative history arguments made by Senators Stevens and Burns." 2 His
main concern seemed to be that Congress was intent on keeping the Internet unregulated, and that the Stevens interpretations would subject it
110. See, e.g., Letter from Harris N. Miller, President, Information Technology Association of America, to the Hon. William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC 1 (Feb. 27, 1998) (particularly good on legislative history issues); Comments of America Online, Inc. 2 (Jan. 26,
1998); Comments of Compuserve, Inc. 8 (Jan. 26, 1998) (all available in FCC Electronic
Comment Filing System <http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ecfs.html>).
111. See, e.g., Comments of GTE 9 (Jan. 26, 1998); Comments of the Rural Telephone
Coalition for the Universal Service Report to Congress 10-17 (Jan. 26, 1998); Comments of
Bell Atlantic 13 (Jan. 26, 1998) (all available in FCC Electronic Comment Filing System,
<http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ecfs.html>).
112. See Letter from U.S. Sen. John McCain to Hon. William E. Kennard 1 (Mar. 16,
1998) (available in FCC Electronic Comment Filing System <http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/
ecfs.html>) [hereinafter McCain Letter]. Senator McCain was a member of the Communications Subcommittee during consideration of the 1996 Act.
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to Title II, or at the very least, great regulatory uncertainty. 113 He explicitly backed the FCC's interpretation of the legislative history. Senators

Ashcroft, Ford, Kerry, Abraham, and Wyden submitted a bipartisan letter taking generally the same position and emphasizing that nothing in
the legislative history indicated congressional intent to radically change
the definitions scheme.1 14 Congressman Rick White, one of the most outspoken advocates for the Internet in Congress and a member of the Telecommunications Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee,
submitted comments emphasizing the importance of allowing the In5
ternet to develop free of government regulation."
The FCC held two days of oral argument in February 1998 on the issues in the Report to Congress. One day was centered almost solely on
the definitions questions and advanced services such as Internet telephony. Senator Stevens's former telecommunications staffer, Earl Comstock, was the star witness on February 19, 1998. He forcefully argued
the Stevens-Burns position and was treated by the Commissioners as one
of the most knowledgeable people in Washington on the legislative history of the 1996 Act.
In formulating its Report to Congress, the FCC found itself in a delicate position. The subject of universal service aroused passions on Capitol Hill, yet prominent members were pulling from opposite directions.
The newly confirmed members of the Commission could not afford to
113. Id. at 2.
114. Letter from U.S. Senator John Ashcroft et al., to Hon. William E. Kennard FCC 1
(March 20, 1998) (availablein FCC, Electronic Comment Filing System, Proceeding 96-45
<http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ecfs.html>) [hereinafter Ashcroft Letter]. These Congressional
communications arguing for differing interpretations of the 1996 Act raise interesting questions when measured against the usual standards of legislative history analysis, which attempt to assign weight to a member's statements based on his or her role in the original
enactment of the language. Here the commenters are a decidedly mixed bag of key players
and newcomers. Senator Pressler, who as Chairman of the Commerce Committee in 199596 played a key role in formulating the legislation, was no longer in the Senate in 1998.
Senators Ashcroft and Kerry were members both of the Commerce Committee and the
Communications Subcommittee, and continued in those positions into the 105th Congress.
Senator Ford was a member of the Committee and Subcommittee in 1995-96 but was not
on Commerce at all when the letter was written. Sen. Abraham was in the Senate in 1996
and joined the Commerce Committee in 1997; at the time the letter was written, he was a
member of both the Committee and the Communications Subcommittee. Sen. Wyden was
a new member of the Senate Commerce Committee and Communications Subcommittee,
but had been on the House Commerce Committee during consideration of the 1996 Act
(not a member of the Telecommunications Subcommittee). Whose views should be given
more weight? Which members were the most conversant with the intended meanings of
the definition sections?
115. See Letter from U.S. Rep. Rick White to the Hon. William E. Kennard (Apr. 8,
1998) (available in FCC, Electronic Comment Filing System, Proceeding 96-45 <http://
www.fcc.gov/e-file/ecfs.html>) [hereinafter White Letter]. Similar comments were filed by
Representatives Schaefer and Allard. Letter from U.S. Rep. Dan Schaefer & U.S. Sen.
Wayne Allard, to Hon. William E. Kennard, Chairman 1 (Apr. 8, 1998) (available in FCC,
Electronic Comment Filing System, Proceeding 96-45 <http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/
ecfs.html>). Schaefer was a member of the Telecommunications Subcommittee in 1995-96
but was not serving on the Committee in 1998. Allard did not serve on the House Commerce Committee during the relevant period and by 1998 was serving as a freshman member of the Senate (not on the Commerce Committee).
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antagonize the powerful Chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee, Senator Stevens. But they had to live on a daily basis with
the equally influential Chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator
McCain, who opposed the Stevens view of the 1996 Act. A vocal and
powerful group from both sides of the Hill was ready to pounce on the
FCC at the first mention of regulating the Internet. Senators from
sparsely populated states wanted major emphasis given to universal service support for rural and high-cost areas, and an equally vociferous
group stood guard over the new E-rate program.
According to conversations with staff members who worked with the
FCC Task Force, the staff worked mostly on its own from January to
March 1998, keeping in touch with the Commissioners' personal staffs
and meeting occasionally with various interested parties to discuss the
issues. 116 Representatives of the Task Force met with Stevens's key
staffer, Earl Comstock, and held some general briefings for Capitol Hill
staff. As is the FCC's usual procedure, the first draft of the Report was
prepared for Chairman Kennard and only circulated to the other Commissioners three weeks before the meeting at which the FCC voted on
the Report. Kennard, formerly FCC general counsel, was undoubtedly
familiar with the crucial legal arguments. At the time it was circulated to
the other Commissioners for comments, the staff draft contained some
unfinished sections, dealing with controversial topics that would probably
be dealt with by the Commissioners themselves anyway. The definitions
section, our principal concern, was not particularly controversial, and apparently did not undergo significant change in the reworking process that
led to the final Commission version.
The finished Report to Congress is important for its style and tone as
well as for its resolution of contested issues. The tone is conciliatory, and
takes the arguments of Senator Stevens and other critics seriously. The
157-page document is extremely careful and thorough in its arguments,
exhibiting what seems to be a genuine willingness to amplify and even
reexamine the positions the FCC had already taken in its universal service and access charge proceedings. It even comes close to conceding
that phone-to-phone Internet telephony might have to be regulated as a
telecommunications service - paying access charges and making universal
service contributions, though leaving final resolution of that issue for
later. 117
On the merits of the definitions issue, the Commission stands firm. It
notes the vital importance of the contested definitions as follows: "All of
116. Telephone conversation with Jonathan Weinberg, Professor, Wayne State University Law School (July 1999). The general characterizations of the process and the contents
of the draft report in this section come from the Weinberg conversation and from a conversation with Melissa Waksman, team leader of the FCC task force, in September 1999.
117. See Report to Congress, supra note 79, at
83-93. The Report deals at length
with the other controversial issues addressed in Section 623, such as which entities will pay
into the fund and receive funding from it and the percentage of federal funding, but these
are not the focus of this Article.
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the specific mandates of the 1996 Act depend on application of the statutory categories established in the definitions section. '118 While conceding that the interpretive issues are difficult, the Report argues that its
earlier decisions were correct: "telecommunications" and "information
service" are mutually distinct categories under the 1996 Act, roughly
equivalent to the FCC's own "basic" and "enhanced" categories. 1 9 In
addition to dealing with each of the items of legislative history raised by
Senator Stevens and others, the Report takes pains to argue that the
FCC's interpretation of these terms will not harm universal service. It
once again analyzes at length the Commission's own regulatory history
and that of the MFJ process, repeatedly referring to the basic goal of the
contamination theory as articulated since Computer II: to keep the Internet and all other information services free of burdensome regulation.
The Commission's political strategy is clear from the text of its Report
to Congress: impress its critics with the thoroughness of its analysis; emphasize its intention to preserve and strengthen universal service; and
treat its opponents' arguments with respect, without giving ground on the
merits, hoping that the criticism from Congress will diminish over time.
While this has apparently happened with regard to the definitions controversy, it clearly has not been the case with regard to its broader universal
service policies. Through 1999, the agency continued to be buffeted by
criticism about various aspects of universal service from Senator Stevens
and others. 120 Calls for reorganization of the FCC and other draconian
measures mark this period as one of the worst for the Commission's relations with Congress.

118. Id. at 21.
119. See id. at
13, 21-32.
120. See, e.g., FCC Must "Redo" Universal Service Funding Plan, Senate Aide Says,
COMM. DAILY, June 22, 1998 (reporting telecommunications seminar including Senate
staffers and Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth); Furchtgott-Roth Blasts FCC's Universal Service Plans, COMM. DAILY, May 18, 1999 (reporting Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth's
speech blasting FCC universal service policies); Frank James, Divided FCC Hikes Funding
for Linking Schools to Internet, CHic. TRIB., May 28, 1999, at 3 (reporting controversial
FCC decision to increase funding for E-rate program); Notebook COMM. DAILY, Apr. 9,
1999 (stating arguments over aspects of E-rate plan); Senate Panel Wants FCC to Revamp
Universal Service Funding, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 18, 1998 (reporting Senate Appropriations
Committee vote to require FCC to restructure universal service administration); Senate
Wants New E-Rate Investigation, COMM. DAILY, June 11, 1999 (reporting Senate Appropriations Committee vote on new E-rate investigation); Senators Eye July Action for New.
USF Assault, COMM. TODAY, June 26, 1998 (explaining rural state Senators planned assault
on universal service); Senators Suggest Expanding Universal Service Contributions, COMM.
DAILY, April 23, 1998 (explaining Senators' arguments that providers of advanced services
should contribute to universal service); David L. Sieradzki & Michele C. Farquhar, Universal Disappointment: Effort to help Rural and Low-Income Consumers Has Gone Awry,
LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1999, at S34 (criticizing generally FCC's universal service policies);
Paul J. Sinderbrand & Robert G. Kirk, Telephony Triggers Oversight, LEOAL TIMES, May
3, 1999, at S39 (stating FCC's problems with the Internet).
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III. THE SEARCH FOR STATUTORY MEANING

With the long and complex background of this dispute behind us, it is
now time to uncover the multiple layers of meaning that lead to the solution to our interpretive problem. Simply stated, the key question is
whether the definitions of "telecommunications" and "information service" in the 1996 Act describe two mutually exclusive categories, and
whether the demarcation line between the two categories is the same as
that maintained by the FCC since Computer I. To return to the archaeological metaphor we began with, it is now necessary to uncover and examine carefully each occasion on which the language in question has been
used by Congress, the FCC, and the courts, and to see what light those
uses shed on the definition sections of the 1996 Act. Each of these layers
of meaning adds something to our overall understanding.
A. THE PLAIN STATUTrORY TEXT
Whether a judge is described as textualist or intentionist, she usually
starts with the so-called "plain meaning" of the statutory terms in question; indeed, common sense dictates that we make an effort to discover
whether our supposedly sophisticated question of statutory meaning is in
fact easily answered by the text itself.
As we have seen, the terms "telecommunications" and "information
service" are absolutely crucial to the application of the statutory scheme
enacted by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Many of
the important regulatory requirements of the Act turn on whether an entity is delivering one service or the other. 12 1 Moreover, the related terms
"telecommunications service" and "telecommunications carrier," also important touchstones of regulation under the Act, are derived from "telecommunications" and thus depend on it for their meaning. None of these
terms was defined in the original 1934 Act. The newly added definitions
are found in Section 3 of the 1996 Act, codified as 47 U.S.C. § 153:
(20) Information Service. The term "information service" means the
offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information
via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does
not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications
system or the manage22
ment of a telecommunications service.'
(43) Telecommunications. The term "telecommunications" means
the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choosing, without change
in the form or
123
content of the information as sent and received.
121. For example, the requirement of interconnection with competitors in section 251
of the 1996 Act applies only to telecommunications carriers and telecommunications services. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. III 1998).
122. S. 652, § 3(a)(1)(B)(41), 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (Supp. III 1998).
123. S. 652, § 3(a)(1)(B)(48), 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. III 1998).
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(44) Telecommunications Carrier. The term "telecommunications
carrier" means any provider of telecommunications services, except
that such term does not include aggregators of telecommunications
services (as defined in section 226 of this title). A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this [Act]
only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications
services, except that the Commission shall determine whether the
provision of fixed124and mobile satellite service shall be treated as
common carriage.
(46) Telecommunications Service. The term "telecommunications
service" means the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly
available
to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively
125
directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used.
Do the definitions themselves, then, determine clearly which interpretation of the statutory language is correct-the FCC's or Senator Stevens's? At the outset it is clear that these are terms of art, without any
common meaning obvious to the layman. Indeed, the meaning of "telecommunications" is especially troublesome. For many years that term
was used exclusively to refer to the telephone business, but more recently
it has come into currency as an over-arching term referring to broadcast,
cable, and telephones. The 1996 Act itself, which uses the term "telecommunications" but encompasses all three areas, is illustrative of this point.
But its predecessor was titled the "Communications Act of 1934," though
it also covered broadcast, telephone, and cable regulation. As for the
other terms, it is hard to see how terms like "information service" and
"telecommunications carrier" could have a commonly understood meaning outside the world of the FCC.
Likewise, the words themselves do not seem to resolve the central
question whether the two key concepts of telecommunications and information service are mutually exclusive. Common sense would certainly
suggest that the telecommunications definition above excludes many
types of computer services, since the user would not always specify the
routing of the information (or even be aware of it), and it would be obvious that the form and content of the information is changed by the computer processing applications. On the other hand, "without change in the
form or content of the information as sent and received" seems to suggest
that some incidental changes to the information along the way would not
take a service out of the "telecommunications" category.
The "information service" definition seems to refer to add-on functionality that is delivered by means of telecommunications ("making available
information via telecommunications"), which certainly suggests that they
are two different things. On the other hand, the Stevens argument that
some information services are mostly information transmissions with only
a small functional add-on does not seem entirely inconsistent with this
124. S. 652, § 3(a)(1)(B)(49), 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (Supp. III 1998).
125. S. 652, § 3(a)(1)(B)(51), 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (Supp. III 1998).
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definition. In his comments, Senator Stevens points to the limiting words
"as sent and received" in the definition of telecommunications as evidence of congressional intent to change the FCC basic/enhanced conceptual dichotomy, and to include certain types of computer processing
under the rubric of telecommunications.' 2 6 The argument collapses, however, when we note that the "as sent and received" language was not new
to the 1996 Act. In fact, it first appears in the MFJ definition of telecomby Judge Greene as consistent with
munications in 1984, and was viewed 127
the FCC's definition of basic service.
Finally, the second sentence in the definition of "telecommunications
carrier" is certainly suggestive of the Stevens interpretation, since it suggests that "telecommunications" and "information service" can be intertwined. It would not be necessary to point out that in such a case a
carrier will only be a telecommunications carrier "to the extent that it is
engaged in providing telecommunications services" if the two concepts
were totally separate. On the other hand, it is possible to interpret this
phrase to refer only to a particular business entity that provides both
types of services to customers, as indeed the Bell companies do. Part of
its business, in other words, could be regulated under Title II as telecommunications and the rest would be unregulated information service.
In fact, analysis of the bare language does not yield a clear answer to
the subtler point at issue. It is simply not possible to ascribe clear meaning to the key phrases "as sent and received" or "via communications,"
for example, without examining the origin of the language, how similar
provisions have been understood in the past, and the intentions of the
drafters of the 1996 Act.
Even broadening one's search, as a textualist would, to an examination
of the rest of the 1996 Act does not add much clarity. The Act makes
some other references to "telecommunications and information services,"1128 which might suggest that they are separate categories, but these
references do not clearly rule out the kind of modest overlap in the definitions argued for by Senator Stevens. They certainly do not negate the
subtler point sometimes made as an alternative theory - the definitions
do not overlap, but the dividing line between them has been moved from
the position outlined by the FCC before the 1996 Act was passed. Senator Stevens in his letter argues that the drafters' addition of the new definition of "telecommunications carrier," which did not exist in the 1934
Act, and their omission of a definition of "information service carrier" in
and of themselves show a desire to create a new conceptual framework, 129 but these seem like obvious makeweights. All of these definitions are new to the Act, so defining "telecommunications carrier" is not
126. Stevens & Burns Letter, supra note 99, at 3-4.
127. See MFJ discussion, infra note 179 and accompanying text. The difficult subject of
protocol conversion and its relation to telecommunications and information service has
been omitted from our discussion for simplicity.
128. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1998).
129. Stevens & Burns Letter, supra note 99, at 3-6.
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surprising. It specifies the category of entities subject to extensive Title II
regulation, so its contours are important. Since providers of information
services are not common carriers, but unregulated end-users of common
carrier transmission services, it surely did not seem necessary to create a
definition of "information service carrier;" the term would have no function under the Act's scheme.
Senator Stevens points to another textual change that, in his view,
shows the intent of Congress to include Internet service providers and
Internet telephony in the telecommunications category. 130 In addition to
adding the new definitions described above, the House bill amended the
existing definition of "telephone exchange service.' 13' To the existing
words that define a telephone exchange service as "service within a telephone exchange, or within a connected system of telephone exchanges
within the same exchange area operated to furnish to subscribers intercommunicating service of the character ordinarily furnished by a single
exchange,"' 32 the House bill as drafted and reported added an alternative
definition: "or (B) comparable service provided through a system of
switches, transmission equipment, or other facilities (or combination
thereof) by which a subscriber can originate and terminate a telecommunications service. ....,,133
Unfortunately, there is nothing in the House Committee Report or in
the floor debate to explain the purpose of this change. In conference, the
amendment was accepted without explanation. In its report the FCC
notes this lack of explanation, and suggests that the best interpretation of
this amendment is much simpler-it was merely intended to recognize
that telecommunications services by telephone companies could be delivered by means other than traditional land lines.' 3 4 Thus, the new definition makes it clear that high-tech wireless exchange service is still covered
by the Act. While this amendment is somewhat troubling to the advocates of the FCC's position, it is difficult to believe that such a small
change, without explanation, could signal a complete rejection of the
FCC's traditional Computer I conceptual framework.
The only other section of the 1996 Act that may shed light on the central policy debate is section 230(b)(2), which was part of a provision
called "Online Family Empowerment" grafted onto the telecommunications reform bill at the last minute in the House and later adopted by the
conferees. 35 This section is drafted like a separate bill. The relevant language, along with the preliminary finding, is as follows:
130. See id. at 2.
131. See H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 501(a)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(47) (1995 &
Supp. III 1998).
132. 47 U.S.C. § 153(r) (1996).
133. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 501(a)(1)(B) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 153(47)) (Supp. III
1998).
134. As noted in Section F infra, the same language appeared in earlier House and
Senate bills.
135. See 141 CONG. REc. H8425-06, H8447 (Aug. 4, 1995) (amendment by Rep. Bliley).
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(a) Findings. - The Congress finds the following:
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
(b) POLICY. It is the policy of the United States to:
(2) preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
computer services, unfetexists for the Internet and other interactive
136
tered by State or Federal regulation.
This language is cited by the Commission in its report 137 by Senate
Commerce Committee Chairman McCain, 138 and by House Internet advocate Rick White 139 as evidence of Congress's intent to preserve the
FCC's distinction between regulated basic services and unregulated enhanced services, albeit with different terminology. It certainly lends support to this philosophical position, but of course begs the question
whether the Stevens interpretation of key definitions would actually harm
or even unduly regulate the Internet. Stevens's position is that the FCC
can still use its forbearance authority to keep the Internet free from burdensome regulation.' 4° It seems clear, however, that the Stevens position
would lead to some regulation of information services under Title II, including the Internet, and would therefore run afoul of this general statement of Congressional concern. Whether such an abstract statement of
policy can resolve a highly technical question of statutory interpretation is
another matter.
B.

THE CONFERENCE REPORT

The next logical place to look for answers to our interpretive problem
is the next layer down in the archaeological history of the 1996 Act, the
House-Senate Conference Report, and its accompanying Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference. Such joint statements
explain, to the extent the conferees wish to explain, how the final form of
the legislation emerged from the differing House and Senate bills, and
why particular portions of each were chosen for inclusion. 14' They can be
extremely helpful in answering questions of statutory meaning as under136. H.R. 1555, §§ 104(a)(4), (b)(2).
137. Report to Congress, supra note 79, at 95.
138. McCain Letter, supra note 112, at 1-2.
139. White Letter, supra note 115, at 1.
140. Stevens & Burns Letter, supra note 99, at 3.
141. H.R. REP. No. 104-458 (1996), reprintedin 1996 USCAN 124. Though the Conference Report is technically only the text of the proposed Act as presented to both houses
for final passage, I follow common usage in referring to both the text and the Conferees'
explanation as the "Conference Report". Language in conference must be agreed upon by
a majority of each house's conferees. While the rules restrict conferees from introducing
new matter or compromising outside the scope of textual disagreement on a particular
number or item, in practice there is considerable latitude.
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stood by the conferees, who were by definition key players in the horse
trading that resulted in the final legislative language. Unfortunately, joint
statements need not explain each crucial choice made by the conferees,
and often for political reasons do not. In addition to explaining why
something was done in conference, however, the conference report must
be mined for another type of evidence: the decisions conferees make in
accepting or rejecting language from one bill or the other. Everyone who
has ever tried to interpret a conference report knows that it is perilous
business to judge by such actions, without accompanying explanation, but
they constitute a type of evidence of intent that cannot be ignored entirely. And since they represent the final phase in drafting a piece of
legislation, they are especially significant in establishing the meaning of
statutory language.
In our case, the conference report says nothing at all about the key
point at issue, the relationship between the definitions of telecommunications and information service. It neither adopts the Stevens theory nor
rejects it. As for the definitions, the joint statement first summarizes the
approaches of the House and Senate, and then concludes as follows:
"Section 3(a) of the conference agreement both amends and adds definitions to Section 3 of the Communication Act .... The Senate recedes to
the House with amendments regarding the definitions of 'Bell Operating
Company', 'exchange access,' 'information service,' and 'local exchange
carrier.'"142 In contrast, "the House recedes to the Senate with amendments with respect to the definitions of 'number portability,' 'telecommunications,' 'telecommunications carrier,' and 'telecommunications
service.' "143
The conferees did not explain either the nature of or the reasons for
the amendments to the House or Senate definitions incorporated into the
final bill. We must, therefore, look to differences in the language to shed
light on this interpretive problem.
As for telecommunications, though the conferees selected the Senate
version with amendments, the two versions were so similar that it is hard
to ascribe much meaning to their choice. The House definition reads:
[Tihe transmission, between or among points specified by the subscriber, of information of the subscriber's choosing, without change
in the form or content of the information as sent and received, by
means of an electromagnetic transmission medium, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (including the collection, storage, forwarding, switching, and delivery of such
information) essential to such transmission.14 4
Similarly, the Senate version defines telecommunications as: "the
transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, including voice, data, image, graphics, and
142. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 116 (1996).
143. Id.

144. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 501(a)(2)(48) (1995).
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video, without change in the form or content of the information, as sent
and received, with or without benefit of any closed transmission
145
medium."
The changes of the Senate definition include deletion of the phrases
"including voice, data, image, graphics, and video" and "with or without
benefit of any closed transmission medium." As modified, it is almost
identical to the first part of the House definition. As we shall see, it is
also closer to the MFJ definition. 146 None of these changes are consequential, and it is hard to argue that the House and Senate versions were
ever materially different.
As to the definition of "information service," the House version prevailed. 147 Though the joint statement refers to adoption of the House
language with amendment, there is no difference between the House definition and the final language. The rejected Senate version is close to the
FCC's Computer II language. It is basically the same as the House version, except that it clarifies the status of protocol processing-it is clearly
an information service. By contrast, the House version does not specify
the status of protocol processing, an omission considered important by
148
Stevens in his argument to the FCC.
In his letter to the Commission during the Section 623 proceeding, Senator Stevens made much of the refusal of the conferees to accept the
House definition of telecommunications services, which explicitly excludes information services. 149 Stevens staffer Earl Comstock relied
heavily on this point in oral argument before the Commission during the
proceeding. 150 A glance at the House and Senate definitions shows that
adoption of the House language would have clinched the argument that
the two categories were intended to be mutually exclusive. The House
version defines telecommunications services as:
the offering, on a common carrier basis, of telecommunications facilities, or of telecommunications by means of such facilities. Such term
does not include an information service."' 5 1 The Senate version provides that telecommunications services are: "the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users
as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless
of the
'1 52
facilities used to transmit the telecommunications service.
145. S. 652, 104th Cong. § 8(11) (1995).
146. See infra, Section III (G) (discussing the Modification of Final Judgment leading to
the 1984 breakup of the Bell System).
147. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 116 (1996).
148. As noted in footnote 127, the issue of protocol processing is being omitted for
simplicity.
149. See Stevens & Burns Letter, supra note 99, at 5-6.
150. See Report to Congress on Universal Service En Banc, transcript at 24 (Feb. 19,
1998) (statement of Earl Comstock, former special counsel for telecommunications to the
Senate Commerce Committee) [hereinafter Testimony of Comstock].
151. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 501(a)(2)(50) (1995) (emphasis added).
152. S. 652, 104th Cong. § 8(b)(mm) (1995).
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If the conferees had simply deleted the second sentence of the House
definition from a portion of the statutory text, the argument that they
intended to reject the meaning embodied in it would be strong. But here
their action was to choose one entire definition over the other-they
adopted the Senate definition of this critical term. No explanation was
given, and no statement was made that the conferees considered telecommunications and information service to be overlapping categories. Nor
does the accepted Senate definition speak to the question of overlap. In
its Report to Congress, the FCC argues that we simply do not know why
the conferees took one definition over the other-since the Senate definition is close to the MFJ version, it might have been for consistency. 153 In
order to shed additional light on this question, it is necessary to examine
the Senate Report to see how the Senate interpreted its definition of telecommunications services, which is the definition that made its way into
the final version of the legislation.

C.

THE FLOOR DEBATE

There is virtually no discussion of these definitional issues, or the policy
disagreement which underlies them, in the House or Senate floor debates. If it means anything, this absence of discussion about the relationship between information service and telecommunications and its
implications for universal service makes it hard to accept the Stevens argument that the 1996 Act represents a rejection of a long-standing FCC
and court interpretation of these concepts. But if, as Stevens argues, his
overlap theory wasn't clarified until the conference, the absence of debate might be more understandable (though in process terms more
troublesome).
Only in one case is a significant definitional change made in floor debate. The Senate amended the definition of "telecommunications service" in the reported bill by deleting the language specifying that a
telecommunications service "includes the transmission, without change in
the form or content, of information services and cable services, but does
not include the offering of those services."'1 54 Stevens argued that the
deletion of this language bolsters his overlap theory, since its inclusion
would have clearly supported the mutual exclusivity of information services and telecommunications. 155 Earl Comstock wrongly argues that the
language was deleted by the conference, lending greater support to the
Stevens version of how the "new" definitions were hammered out. 156 In
fact, as the FCC Report points out, the provision was deleted by the Senate before final passage of its version, not in conference. 57 The question,
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Report to Congress, supra note 79, at 39.
S. 652, 104th Cong. § 8(b)(mm) (1995).
See Stevens and Burns Letter, supra note 99, at 5.
See Testimony of Comstock, supra note 150, at 24.
See Report to Congress, supra note 79, at 43.
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therefore, is whether that action indicates Senate acceptance of the overlap theory.
Examination of the debate shows that this language change was made
by a manager's amendment. In a colloquy between the bill manager,
Senator Pressler (then Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee)
and Senator Kerrey, Senator Kerrey asks whether the change will affect
the scope of any of the bill's substantive provisions. 158 Replying in the
negative, Senator Pressler explained that: "The deletion of this sentence
is intended to clarify that the carriers of broadcast and cable services are
not intended to be classified as common carriers under the Communication Act to the extent they provide broadcast services or cable
services."' 59
The FCC Report labors mightily to explain this amendment, and does
not quite succeed. 16° While it is one of the strongest arguments Senator
Stevens presents for congressional intent to change the regulatory landscape, the colloquy seems to negate any such far-reaching purpose. Also,
this change was not part of a grand bargain among the conferees, as Senator Stevens and his assistant argue, but was a routine amendment on the
floor of the Senate. All in all, it seems less than decisive in establishing
the Stevens view of the statutory definitions.
D.

THE SENATE REPORT

Continuing our journey back in time to the origins of the key statutory
language, the next logical point in the legislative process is examination
of the written reports of the House and Senate committees responsible
for considering and reporting the legislation. These reports have traditionally been viewed as authoritative sources of interpretations, at least of
their own versions of a bill. Where the conference committee indicates
that the House recedes to the Senate on a particular provision, for example, it seems appropriate to examine the Senate Report as evidence of the
meaning as accepted by the entire conference, and therefore of the meaning of the completed legislation.
As noted above, the joint statement of managers states that the House
receded to the Senate on the definition of "telecommunications." The
Senate Report states explicitly that its concept of telecommunications
"excludes those services ...that are defined as information services.' 16'
Note here that this explanation of the meaning of the Senate version of
the definition lends further support to the argument that the conferees
were not choosing between alternative meanings when they rejected the
House version of "telecommunications." We can see now that both the
House and Senate committees believed that telecommunications and information service were mutually exclusive.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See 141 CONG. REc. 15,386 (1995).
Id.
See Report to Congress, supra note 79, at
S. REP. No. 104-23, at 18 (1995).

42-43.
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Likewise, the conference accepted the Senate version of "telecommunications services."'1 62 The Senate Report says that the term "does not
include information services.., but does include the transmission, without change in the form or content, of such services. ' 163 While this language again clearly supports the FCC interpretation, it relies on the
portion of the committee definition deleted on the floor. If that deletion
had an unrelated purpose, this explanation still clarifies the overall definition and lends further support to the FCC view. But if Stevens is right
and the deletion supports an overlap theory, then it can be argued that
this language is superseded by the amendment and should be disregarded. As noted above, Stevens is probably wrong. Moreover, since the
Senate Committee also interpreted "telecommunications" to exclude "information services," and this definition remained unchanged in the final
bill, it is fair to conclude that the Senate Report supports the FCC theory.
Further evidence of the Senate's understanding of the relationship between telecommunications and information service is found in its discussion of Section 253(c) of the Senate bill. That section specifies that all
telecommunications carriers should contribute to universal service. The
joint statement of managers says that the House receded to the Senate on
this section, and therefore, the Senate committee's report is relevant. Its
explanatory language is quite telling:
New section 253(c) does not require providers of information services to contribute to universal service. Information services providers do not "provide" telecommunications services; they are users of
telecommunications services. The definition of telecommunications
service specifically excludes the offering of information services (as
opposed to the transmission of such services for a fee) precisely to
avoid imposing common carrier obligations on information service
164
providers.
Again, the second sentence above refers to a portion of the definition of
telecommunications service deleted on the floor of the Senate. Even so,
the overall intent of the Senate committee here clearly rejects the Stevens
overlap interpretation and supports the FCC position as articulated in its
Report to Congress.
Finally, as to the Senate Report, it is instructive to note that Senator
Burns included a separate statement expressing concerns about aspects of
the bill, but he does not discuss the definitions, universal service, or Internet service providers generally. This is a curious omission if, as he says
in his joint letter with Senator Stevens, he supported an overlap theory
which would subject ISPs and other information services providers to universal service charges.

162. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 116 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
163. S. REP. No. 104-23, at 18 (1995).
164. Id. at 28.
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E.

THE HOUSE REPORT

As we have seen, the House version of the 1996 Act, H.R.1555, was the
165
source of the "information service" definition in the final legislation.
Nevertheless, the House Committee Report contains little of relevance.
As noted above, the House Committee version of "telecommunications"
clearly supported the FCC view of mutual exclusivity, but that definition
was not chosen by the conferees. The Report offers little explanation for
its definition of "information service," which was incorporated into the
Act, except to say that it, along with the definition of "telecommunications," "[is] defined based on the definition used in the Modification of
'166
Final Judgment.
F.

PRECURSOR HOUSE AND SENATE BILLS

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the culmination of many
years of effort on the part of key legislators in both the House and Senate. The House Committee Report notes the antecedent bills, and conversations with staffers who worked on the legislation confirm that S. 642
and H.R. 1555 were in fact modifications of earlier legislation. 167 Analyzing how these earlier bills dealt with the key issue at hand may aid us in
understanding the Act.
The most important Senate antecedent of the 1996 Act was S.1822, the
so-called Hollings-Danforth bill reported out by the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation on September 14, 1994.168
Though it was developed and reported out by the Committee while the
Senate was under Democratic control, S.1822 bears a strong resemblance
to the final form of the 1996 Act, passed under Republican leadership.
The principal issues addressed-local telephone interconnection, entry
into long-distance, cable regulation, and universal service, to name a
few-are the same, though the details often differ. The same deregulatory, pro-competition thrust is present in both bills, and the definitions
section bears out the close relationship.
As reported by the committee, the definitions of telecommunications
and information service in S.1822 clearly adopt the FCC contamination
theory and reject the Stevens overlap theory. "Telecommunications" is
the MFJ definition, with the addition of the explanatory phrase "including voice, data, image, graphics, or video."'1 69 The language is close to the
final Senate version of the 1996 Act, and the first clause is the same as the
final language of the 1996 Act.' 70 Likewise, "telecommunications service" embodies the same general concept as the 1996 Act, but uses different phrasing. The definition provides unequivocally that "[s]uch term
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 501(a)(2)(41) (1995).
H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 125 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10.
S. REP. No. 104-23, at 10 (1995).
S. 1822, 103d Cong. (1994).
S. 1822, 103d Cong. § 301(h) (1994).
See S. 652, 104th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(B)(48) (1995).
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does not include information services .... ,171 The Report makes it clear
that the "regardless of the facilities used" language, which Stevens interprets to encompass internet service providers, was in fact intended to include alternate means of delivering telecommunications services, such as
wireless systems and mobile phones.' 72 The definition of "information
service" is basically the FCC's Computer II definition, 173 clearly the precursor to the later Senate version of the 1996 Act.
The Senate Report also contains a helpful discussion of the scope of its
telecommunications carrier definition, which is the same as the first sentence of the final language in the 1996 Act. The report points out that a
company might provide to customers both telecommunications service
and information service as separate services, in which case only the former would be subject to common carrier regulation. 174 In other words, it
draws a crucial distinction between commercial combinations of telecommunications and information services and an actual blurring of the line
between the two concepts. This point, as we have seen, was then written
into the final definition of telecommunications carrier in the 1996 Act.' 75
Interestingly, S.1822 contains a provision not found in the bills introduced during the next Congress that led to the 1996 Act. Section 234(a)
regulates the provision by the Bell Operating Companies of "gateway"
services, which provide access to the Internet, and clearly defines them as
information services, not telecommunications. 76 This is the precise point
raised by Senator Stevens in the Section 623 proceeding five years laterone of his principal interpretive goals was to classify such services as
telecommunications.
There were also House precursors to the 1996 Act. The most important were two closely-related bills passed by the House in 1994 dealing
with the same issues as the 1996 Act. 177 H.R. 3626 was reported out by
both Judiciary and Commerce, and major portions of it dealt with the
MFJ process. It contained the addition to the definition of "telephone
exchange service" referred to above, and again there was no explanation
in the Committee Report as to the reason for the change. The bill's basic
definitions paralleled those of H.R. 1555 in 1996. Further, the Report
notes that they were intended to have the same meaning as those in the
178
MFJ.

H.R. 3636 was reported only by the Commerce Committee, but

has many sections that are similar to those in H.R. 3626. The definitions
are the same.
171. S. 1822, 104th Cong. § 301(jj) (1994).
172. S. REP. No. 103-367, at 54 (1994).
173. Id. at 55; S. 1822, 103d Cong. § 301(mm) (1994).
174. S. REP. No. 103-367, at 55 (1994).
175. See Section III (A), supra.
176. S. 1822, 103d Cong. § 234(a) (1994). See also S. REP. No. 103-367, at 82 (1994).
177. There were numerous other bills dealing with telecommunications reform in the 20
years preceding. See, e.g., H.R. 6121, 96th Cong. (1979), S. 1981, 101st Cong. (1989), S. 173,
102d Cong. (1991), H.R. 5096, 102d Cong. (1992). The definitions used in these bills are
similarly based on the MFJ language. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102-850, at 102 (1992).
178. H.R. REP. No. 103-559(l), at 50 (1994).
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G.

THE MODIFICATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT

All the bills leading up to the final version of the 1996 Act referred to
the Modification of Final Judgment in the Bell System antitrust case,
which led to the breakup of the system and the creation of the separate
Bell Operating Companies in 1984.179 Examination of Judge Greene's
operating definitions in the MFJ show that he and the FCC agreed on the
relationship between telecommunications and information services. 180
The issue was not just of academic concern to Judge Greene, as he was
called upon repeatedly to pass upon requests for waivers by AT & T and
the Bell Operating Companies allowing them to enter various new data
processing businesses.
Clearly, the 1996 definitions which found their way into the Act were
based upon the MFJ definitions. 181 This is not surprising, given that a key
purpose of the reform legislation was to modify and supplant the MFJ
process, returning full regulatory authority over the telephone business to
the FCC. This was especially apparent in the House, where the final version of H.R. 1555 represented a compromise between the ideas of the
Commerce and Judiciary Committees and a managers' amendment
key parts of a pending Judiciary Committee bill
folded in some of the 182
dealing with the MFJ.
The MFJ definitions clearly adopted the FCC's key distinction in Computer II between pure transmission capacity, treated as a regulated common carrier activity, and enhanced functionality of any kind, treated as an
unregulated end-user activity. 183 For Judge Greene, the distinction was
also important for the antitrust theory of the Bell System case, since the
core idea was to confine the Bell Operating Companies to regulated common carrier businesses and to prohibit their entry into other competitive
179. See United States v. AT&T., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
180. See id. at 229.
181. See id. Judge Greene defined the terms relevant to this discussion as the following:
"Information service" means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information which may be conveyed via telecommunications, except that such service does not include any use of any such capability for the
management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the
management of a telecommunications service.
"Telecommunications" means the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in
the form or content of the information as sent and received, by means of
electromagnetic transmission medium, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (including the collection, storage, forwarding,
switching, and delivery of such information) essential to such transmission.
"Telecommunications service" means the offering for hire of telecommunications facilities, or of telecommunications by means of such facilities.
Id.
182. See 141 CONG. REc. 22,026 (1995) (amendment by Rep. Bliley).
183. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 185.
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businesses.'8 4 Provision of information services, as broadly defined, was
one of the lines of business forbidden to the Bell Operating Companies. 185 As we have seen, this is exactly the same distinction as that articulated by the FCC in Computer I in walling off enhanced services
from regulation.
In the years that followed the original decree, Judge Greene was often
called upon to rule on requests for waivers of the line-of-business restrictions on the Bell Companies. In allowing them to build advanced transmission systems for the information services provided by others, and to
engage in such information services as e-mail, he reiterated the distinction between pure transmission capacity and enhanced functionality by
making it clear that even basic protocol processing and transmission of
information services technically qualified as "information services" and
thus required a waiver. 18 6 In other words, he enforced the same conceptual regime described in the FCC Report to Congress in 1998. Because
the House and Senate went out of their way in drafting the definitions to
adopt the MFJ language, the implication is strong that they also adopted
the conceptual framework-that telecommunications and information
services were mutually exclusive categories.
H.

S. 898

IN

1981

Our search for the ultimate source and meaning of the key definitions
found in the 1996 Act requires the uncovering of one more layer of pot
shards. That involves an attempt to find Judge Greene's sources for the
definitions he included in the MFJ.
After the FCC promulgated its Computer I! decision in 1980, adopting
for the first time the mutually exclusive categories of basic and enhanced
services that are at the root of this study, key senators introduced a bill to
write the FCC approach into law. 187 As the committee report on S. 898
makes clear,18 8 the Senate was concerned that the FCC might change its
approach and begin to regulate the emerging information services industry, and it wanted to head off any such result.
While the definition of "telecommunications" in this bill contains some
additional language, 189 it is clearly the source not only of the MFJ definitions, but also of the final language in the 1996 Act. 190 The crucial omission here, added in the MFJ definition and carried forward into the 1996
Act, includes "as sent and received" language modifying the notion of
184. See id. at 143.
185. Id.
186. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 544-45 (D.D.C. 1987);
affd in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
187. S. 898 was introduced in 1981 by Sen. Packwood. Original co-sponsors were: Senators Goldwater, Kassebaum, Pressler, Stevens, Kasten, Inouye, Schmitt, and Cannon.
188. See S. REP. No. 97-170, at 24 (1981).
189. S. 898, 97th Cong., §301(42) (1981).
190. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 181 n.206 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub
nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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format and content change. 19 1 The definition of "information service" is
identical in all important respects to the final one in 1996, and again appears to be the source of the MFJ language. 192 The definitions of "telecommunications service"'193 and "telecommunications carrier"' 94 differ
somewhat from the later versions, but clearly provide that one who is a
telecommunications carrier cannot be a provider of information
services.

95

I.

SUMMARY

Further attempts to find the sources of the definitions used by the Senate in 1981 have not been successful. What is clear at the end of this
search for statutory meaning is that nearly all of the evidence points
strongly toward the FCC's conclusion in its Report to Congress. The language used by Congress in the 1996 Act to define these crucial terms was
drawn from the Modification of Final Judgment, which accepted the conceptual framework, but not the language of the FCC's 1980 decision in
Computer IL That decision and its distinction between regulated basic
services and unregulated enhanced services were well known to all of the
main actors in our story, including the members of the two Commerce
Committees and industry representatives. In the end, the FCC's most
powerful argument is that acceptance of the Stevens view of the definitions would mean that Congress reversed the well-known, eighteen-yearold regulatory framework of the FCC without any explicit acknowledgment of its doing so. In the face of the many positive indications that
both the Senate and House committees intended to maintain the mutual
exclusivity of telecommunications and information services, such an implied repeal seems highly unlikely and quite unreasonable.
More recent developments in Congress indicate that Senator Stevens's
view of the statute remains a distinctly minority one. Throughout the rest
of 1998, after the FCC Report was delivered in April, the battle over
including Internet services in universal service funding continued. Stevens and Burns and their rural-state allies stood on one side, and their
definitions argument was only one weapon of several employed. On the
other side stood a large group of House and Senate advocates of an unregulated Internet, and they included most of the congressional
leadership.
In debate over the explosive issue of taxation of Internet commerce,
the definitions issues emerged again, because defining which services
were "information services" and thus outside of the states' taxing authority and which were traditional "telecommunications services" subject to
191. Id. at 229.
192. S. 898, 97th Cong. § 103(19) (1981).
193. S. 898, 97th Cong. § 103(44) (1981).
194. S. 898, 97th Cong. § 103(43) (1981).
195. "A person engaged in any non-telecommunications activities, in providing any information service or information software ... shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a [telecommunications] carrier." Id.
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state taxing authority, was crucial. 196 This time Senator McCain and the
Internet advocates left nothing to chance. The Internet Tax Freedom Act
enacted in October 1998 contains the following definition:
(7) Internet Access. - The term "internet access" means a service
that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or
other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access
to proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a
Such term does not inpackage of services offered to consumers.
197
clude telecommunications services.
Even acknowledging that this definition does not technically change the
Communications Act of 1934, it is persuasive evidence that the FCC's
reading of overall congressional intent was correct. The statutory terms
are the same, and precisely the same policy issues are involved. There is
no sign in the record that Senators Stevens and Burns even attempted to
gain acceptance of their overlap theory in the Internet Tax Freedom Act.
Indeed, as a policy matter, the overlap concept would have made the
Act's prohibitions on taxation of the Internet extremely difficult to
implement.
This is not to say, of course, that Senators Stevens and Burns are wrong
as a matter of sound telecommunications policy, but only that Congress
did not intend such a result. Time will tell whether their prediction that
the FCC's approach will weaken universal service funding to the detriment of rural areas will prove correct. Professor Weinberg, who played a
key role in drafting the sections of the FCC Report dealing with the definitions, has since argued that the FCC's policy, while legally justifiable, is
too rigid and has been overtaken by technological change. 198 He argues
for a more subtle line between telecommunications and information services. 199 An extended discussion of the policy aspects of the debate is beyond the scope of this Article, but suffice it to say that the 1996 Act may
well have to undergo significant amendment to deal adequately with the
myriad regulatory and policy issues raised by the Internet and the convergence of telecommunications technologies.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

In this section we will attempt to sketch some of the implications for
law and policy emerging from this particular search for statutory meaning. We will not focus any significant attention on its implications for the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 itself. Rather we will ask whether our
study sheds light on similar problems of statutory interpretation and on
future agency processes for interpreting statutes. While a full-dress consideration of interpretive theory is beyond the scope of this Article, we
196. 144 CONG. REC. S11679 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. McCain).
197. H.R. 3529, 105th Cong. § 155(7) (1998) (PUB. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-719).
198. See Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommunications Services," Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16
YALE J. ON REG. 211, at 227 (1999).
199. See id. at 229.

SOURCES OF STATUTORY MEANING

20001

will also examine briefly some implications for Chevron and the Supreme
Court's approach to statutory interpretation by agencies.
A.

WHAT DID SECTION 623 ACCOMPLISH?

Initially, we might well ask whether Senator Stevens accomplished anything with his unique statutory provision ordering the FCC to formally
reconsider and explain its interpretation of key terms of the 1996 Act.
He did not, as we have seen, persuade the new commissioners to adopt
his view of the interrelationship between telecommunications and information service. He certainly did force the FCC to justify its approach in
more detail, and he focused attention on the absolute centrality of the
definitions to the statutory scheme. He succeeded, in parts of the FCC
Report not relevant to our discussion, in forcing the FCC to explain some
of its other regulatory choices in carrying out the universal service mandate and in prolonging and deepening the arguments over the E-rate program in Congress. 20 0 While it may not have been his intention, he also
succeeded in broadening the debate over definitions to a variety of industry groups, state entities, and others.
Ironically, though Senator Stevens lost the argument before the FCC,
his view may well prevail in the end. By forcing the FCC to adopt a fully
articulated contamination theory, he may have deprived it of the flexibility to deal with the raging convergence taking place among the Internet,
cable, and traditional telephone systems. As it becomes increasingly clear
that new regulatory techniques are necessary to deal with the Internet
and Internet access businesses, pressure will increase on Congress to
amend the 1996 Act so as to more easily accommodate the new technological reality. While Stevens is almost certainly wrong in his view of
what Congress intended to do in the 1996 Act, he may turn out to be right
about what it ought to have done.
B.

GENERAL LESSONS FOR THE THEORY OF STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION

On a more general level, what does this in-depth look at an important
dispute over the meaning of a recent statute teach us about the process of
statutory interpretation? By probing the many layers of statutory, regulatory, and judicial activity relevant to an interpretive problem, I hope that
we can see some obvious points that are sometimes lost in the often-abstract intellectual disputes over methods of statutory interpretation. For
example, we should take from this study a lesson often forgotten in the
law review debates-that disputes over statutory meaning are almost always debates over policy, not law. The Supreme Court recognized this

truism in its Chevron opinion, 20 1 but, as I will argue below, drew the
200. See generally articles cited, supra note 120. A Lexis search in current news materials with "E-rate" as the search term produces hundreds of articles during 1998 and 1999.
201. See supra discussion accompanying note 94.
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wrong conclusions from it. Because most important disputes over statutory meaning are arguments over competing policy alternatives, the process of statutory interpretation must fundamentally be a practical one.
Too often in debating whether we are seeking the intention of Congress,
or the intention of some hypothetical Congress, or the meaning some average observer would give to a phrase, we ignore the underlying reality.
As this case study shows, a common sense approach stripped of unnecessary doctrinal baggage is usually best.2 0 2 Congress passed a statute containing certain legal mechanisms affecting important private and public
interests, and we should ask ourselves how Congress wanted those mechanisms to work.
Our study also shows another important truism about many, though
not all, problems of statutory meaning-they can be complex, involving
many layers of meaning developed over time, each affecting the next.
Much of the theoretical writing about statutory interpretation, and many
court opinions, give insufficient attention to the development of meaning
as a dynamic process. The strict textualists, who cut themselves off artificially from the dynamic process of meaning development illustrated in
our study, are those most likely to miss this point, and therefore to arrive
at a "wrong" result. Cases such as MCI v. AT&T, which pitch the debate
at the level of competing dictionary definitions, carry this unreality to the
20 3
ultimate absurdity.
Consider again, as an illustration of the dynamic process of developing
meaning over time, the capsule history of the key terms analyzed in this
study. The FCC develops the concepts of basic and enhanced services
through a series of open APA rulemakings, with wide industry and expert
participation. The relevant industry actors operate under these definitions in making important business decisions over many years, interacting
with the FCC. Federal courts adopt the Commission's conceptual framework using different words, and use it to decide cases. Congress finally
legislates in the area, once more using slightly different wording. The
FCC then interprets the new language in the course of continuing its regulatory work, again with wide outside participation. Congress makes a
formal demand for reconsideration of the conceptual framework. The
FCC then opens a final debate on the meaning of the statute, this time
with Congress itself participating, along with the industry, the states, experts and even the Executive Branch. The Commission, finally, continues
its regulatory activity in light of its restated interpretations. While we
should not expect that every problem of statutory meaning will present
interpreters with such a rich and diverse history, statutory interpretation
in the regulatory context often shows the same kind of dynamic
characteristic.
202. Of all the hundreds of articles written about statutory interpretation in the last
twenty years, the one that makes this point most convincingly is William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321
(1990). It should be required reading in the chambers of every federal judge.
203. MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1994).
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Can our current theories of statutory interpretation accommodate this
kind of complex process of statutory development? I would argue in the
case of textualism that it cannot, and that consequently, textualism is an
unrealistic theory for many real world problems of statutory meaning.
But even those who look at traditional legislative history materials in
resolving an issue of statutory meaning must broaden their interpretive
scope when faced with a complex history like this one. Certainly a judge
needs an approach that allows her to look at regulatory history as well as
legislative activity and court decisions. This same judge should be able to
take into account the views of industry groups operating under the statute
and other outside interpreters, particularly if the views come in as part of
a formal process. Our abhorrence of post-enactment legislative history
should also give way to the extent that there was a formal post-enactment
dialogue between Congress and an agency, as occurred in this case. Finally, a court should feel comfortable looking at the policy arguments
involved as well, so long as those arguments are analyzed in the context
of the entire historical process of meaning development.
If a court were to consider the full range of history, encompassing all
layers of meaning uncovered in our archaeological expedition, how would
it characterize its interpretive theory? It would certainly not be textualist.
It is not really intentionalist either, since the relevant question is much
broader than what was meant by a particular legislative enacting group in
1996. Perhaps a new term is needed to identify a much more processoriented institutional sense of statutory meaning. I leave that for another
article.
A final broad lesson for those who work with the theory of statutory
interpretation is that all questions of statutory interpretation, all searches
for statutory meaning, are not alike. Indeed, the differences in the various kinds of interpretive problems may justify different approaches.
Most court decisions and many scholarly writings treat these issues as if
all questions of statutory meaning are essentially similar and would benefit from the same interpretive techniques and the same allocation of interpretive authority. I would argue, however, that there are at least three
different kinds of situations in which a substantial dispute over statutory
meaning can arise, and that each can benefit from a slightly different
treatment.
First, there is the question of interpreting a broad enabling term enacted by Congress to guide agencies or the courts. Most of these "enabling" phrases appear in regulatory statutes, like the Communications
Act of 1934,204 but some appear in court-administered statutes such as
Section 1983205 or the Sherman Act.20 6 All are characterized by extremely broad language with a wide latitude for different interpretations.
Examples are "public, convenience, interest or necessity" in the Commu204. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. III 1997).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (Supp. IV 1998).
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nications Act, 20 7 and "unfair methods of competition" in the Federal

20 8
Trade Commission Act.

These phrases do not really present interpretive problems at all, because they embody broad delegations of policy making power to agencies
and the courts. Instead of articulating a specific meaning or set of meanings, Congress has, through its broad language, handed over interpretive
power to an expert agency. While we sometimes debate whether these
phrases run afoul of the delegation doctrine, 20 9 over time we have become comfortable with the idea that agencies give content to these empty
legal vessels, using both caselaw and informal rulemaking. We come to
realize that it is simply not helpful to ask what Congress meant, or means
today, by the phrase "public convenience, interest or necessity." Its
meaning is what the FCC has determined it to be over many years of
regulatory activity.
Second, we recognize instinctively that some statutory terms are more
important than others, and I call those "defining" terms. Disputes over
defining terms raise different issues and must be approached in a different way than the enabling terms discussed above or the more mundane
ones discussed below. A defining term is one that determines the scope
of a statutory scheme, either by defining the entities subject to government power or the scope of the regulatory power granted to an agency.
The dispute analyzed in this study is over defining terms, since the definitions in the 1996 Act are the key to the entire regulatory scheme. Obviously, jurisdictional terms have the same characteristic. Professor Clark
Byse, Justice Breyer, and others have observed that all statutory terms
should not be treated alike, 210 but too often the special requirements of
defining terms are overlooked.
As argued below, this issue is of special relevance in applying Chevron.
Indeed, the distinction between defining terms and other less important
ones may explain the difference between the celebrated Hearst and Packard cases 2 11 - it is surely more important to the statutory scheme to decide the scope of managerial employees under the labor laws (Packard)
than to decide whether a particular group of newsmen are employees or
independent contractors (Hearst). The term also echoes the discussion of
207. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a) (Supp. III 1997).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
209. A footnote is not the place to explain the delegation (or non-delegation) doctrine,
which in theory at least prohibits Congress from giving policy-making powers to agencies.
After a brief flirtation with enforcement during the New Deal years, the Supreme Court
has virtually abandoned the doctrine in the last sixty years. Scholarly critics and judges
concerned about the excessive policy discretion granted to agencies have recently been
attempting to resurrect the delegation doctrine. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFLCIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment).
210. Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretationof Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 262 (1988) ; Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview
of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1986) .
211. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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jurisdictional facts in Crowell, where the Supreme Court determined that
some facts are simply too critical to the statutory scheme to be decided
finally by the agency administering it.212 Defining terms call into play important considerations of a court's role under the APA, and the need to
exercise some control over the administrative agency under our constitutional scheme.
If defining terms can be thought of as law-establishing, the third category of statutory interpretation questions can be thought of as law-applying. These disputes tend to arise at lower levels of detail in the statutory
scheme, and their implications are less far-reaching. Philosophers and
legal scholars have argued at length over what it means to say that a term
is "ambiguous," but at this level I am seeking a more practical morphology. What are the broad categories of problems that agencies and courts
confront when they seek to apply statutory language to real world situations? Though it is not centrally important to our study, I would argue
that there are at least four different categories of ambiguity that arise at
this law-applying level.
A first common situation is where Congress apparently intend to set
down a particular standard, mechanism or direction, but left its meaning
unclear. The ambiguity, if that is what we choose to call it, may stem
from many sources. The statute may contain a word or words that have
more than one common meaning, leaving the court or agency to discover
Congress's intention, if possible. Sentence structure or punctuation may
produce two or more ways of reading a sentence, and the interpreter
must choose between or among them based on some standard. Likewise,
Congress may simply have made an error and used the wrong wordsometimes this is obvious and sometimes it only becomes apparent after
close analysis of the statutory mechanism.
Aside from these linguistic ambiguities, in which more than one meaning might be the "correct" one, situations may arise where a word or sentence or whole paragraph seems clear on its face, and was intended to
deal with a specific question, but may be inconsistent with other provisions of the statute. There the interpreter must search for an overall
meaning, if possible, that makes the statute work toward the desired end.
Agencies often confront such problems, particularly in complex statutes
or statutes that have been amended multiple times. The 1996 Act itself
contains a good example of this in Section 254(h)-its provisions regarding universal service payments to schools, libraries, and rural health providers were written by a different group of senators and staffers, and do
not fit well with the rest of the section. 213
212. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932).
213. The FCC in its Universal Service Order faced such a conflict in deciding whether
Internet service providers, though they are exempted from paying universal service
charges, might nonetheless be eligible to receive payments under § 254(h) in serving
schools and libraries. The statutory provisions at issue seem conflicting. See Universal
Service Order,supra note 67, 590-591.
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Another type of as-applied ambiguity arises where the statutory text
simply does not address a particular question. Congress may not have
written the statute at this level of detail, or may have known about a
problem but avoided dealing with it for political reasons. More commonly, we recognize that complex statutes like environmental laws or the
1996 Act cannot possibly address every issue that will arise later in application. In any case, the agency or court is left with a gap-filling role. It
often must infer from the existing terms of the statute how the unaddressed question should be answered. Again, the 1996 Act is filled with
214
such instances.
A final type of as-applied ambiguity arises from the use of terms of art.
Particularly in complex regulatory statutes, Congress may use terms that
have no obvious meaning except in the context of the industry or regulatory scheme involved. An interpreter must step inside the particular conceptual world of that statute and its context in order to give a business or
technical term its "correct" meaning. The 1996 Act abounds with examples-"unbundled network elements" in the interconnection sections is
perhaps as good an example as any. In these cases, Congress presumably
had a specific meaning in mind, but simply used the term of art as an
agreed-upon short-hand rather than supplying a full definition.
Textualists and intentionalists will approach these different types of interpretation questions differently, and as argued below, the role of agency
expertise will vary for each. At some level, even the committed textualist
must admit that help is needed. For example, while Justice Scalia generally eschews the use of legislative history to resolve any variety of ambiguity, he seems to allow extensive use of legislative history materials
when faced with a term of art.215 It is at this level that textualist approaches are the least helpful, since their relatively narrow focus cannot
give meaning to terms of art, and dictionaries are often not helpful.
There is overlap, of course. For example, the dispute in this study is
arguably over terms of art, but the particular terms of art are crucial definitions that determine the contours of the regulatory scheme. Some of
the lessons learned dealing with highly technical but relatively unimportant terms, therefore, can be applied to cases where the technical mean214. A good example of a gap-filling question is the controversy over the "pick and
choose" rule in the interconnection provisions of the 1996 Act. Section 251(i) provides
that local telephone companies must provide any network element bargained for by one
competing company to others on the same contract terms. The provision does not address
the real life situation in which the local company enters into several contracts for different
combinations of network elements with companies seeking interconnection. May the next
competitor "pick and choose" among the best prices in each contract, or is the local carrier
obliged only to match the best overall contract terms it has given someone else? The
FCC's rules said that competition could indeed pick and choose, even though the local
companies complained that such a rule destroys any give-and-take among terms in an overall interconnection agreement. The Supreme Court ruled that the FCC's rule was reasonable, reversing the Eighth Circuit. Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 119 S. Ct. 721, 738 (1999).
It seems obvious that this specific problem with negotiated interconnection agreements
was simply not considered by Congress.
215. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567-68 (1988).
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ings to be found define the scope of the statute. Nonetheless, these three
broad categories of meaning disputes call into play a different balancing
of the crucial legal interests involved-the proper roles of court, Congress, and agency; the expertise of the agency; and respect for Congress as
the ultimate fount of policy judgments.
C.

CHEVRON ISSUES

Since the Court decided Chevron v. NRDC in 1984, courts hearing statutory interpretation cases involving an administrative agency have had to
consider the implications of that now-famous decision. 216 There the
Court held that in cases in which an agency's interpretation of a statute it
administers is at issue, the judge must first determine if the Congress has
spoken on the precise issue in question and resolved it in the statute. If it
has, Congress's meaning controls. If it has not resolved the question, but
rather written a statutory term that is ambiguous or silent, then the
agency's interpretation of it must be accepted by the court if it is "permissible. '2 17 Prior to Chevron, as one who has taught Administrative Law
over the years can attest, the federal courts' decisions on matters of statutory interpretation were hard to reconcile. One line of cases stood for
substantial deference to agency interpretations, and another asserted the
ultimate primacy of a federal judge in deciding questions of statutory interpretation. 218 It was possible for commentators to identify various factors that would lead a court to defer or decide, including, in Professor
Jaffe's words:
(1) the degree to which the framing of a rule appears to depend on
expertise, (2) the clarity with which a rule can be made to emerge
and be given a stable form and content, (3) the importance of the
rule in the statutory and administrative scheme, (4) the possible psychological advantage of judicial as compared with administrative
pronouncement, and (5) the 219
role of the court as the guardian of the
integrity of the legal system.
Chevron changed that calculus forever, substituting a deceptively simple two-step process of decision when agency interpretations are at issue.
The case has been the subject of much comment and analysis. Supporters
have claimed that it recognizes the reality of agency primacy in policy
matters and superior agency expertise, while detractors have protested
that it represents an abdication by the federal courts of their constitutional role to decide what the law is.220 The certainty promised by the
216. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
217. Id. at 843.
218. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 3.1, at 107-109 (3d ed. 1994); Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546-594 (1965).
219. JAFFE, supra note 218, at 576.
220. For supporters, see, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and
Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1997). For detractors, see, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statu-
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decision has been an illusion. This is partly because the Supreme Court
itself doesn't always use it, and partly because the two steps have proven
capable of flexible interpretation. The decision was widely seen as shifting power from Congress to agencies and the Executive Branch, but recent scholarship has cast doubt on that premise. 221 In particular, the
tendency of Justice Scalia and other conservative judges to stop at step
one, finding no ambiguity where ambiguity seems to exist, has tended to
shift interpretive power to the courts. Thus, Justice Scalia has said that he
is a strong supporter of the Chevron doctrine, but he has also observed
that a textualist like himself is prone to avoid its result altogether by find222
ing no ambiguity in the statutory provision in step one.
Based on my reading of the cases and many years of discussions in
Administrative Law classes about Chevron, I much prefer the old caseby-case approach to presumptive agency deference in statutory interpretation cases. The decision has,. in my view, four serious flaws that are
223
ultimately fatal.
First, Chevron errs conceptually by forcing courts to treat all statutory
interpretation questions alike, when in fact there are great differences
among them that call for differing treatment by a reviewing court. As
noted above, there are at least three types of controversies over statutory
meaning. Disputes rarely center on enabling phrases, because they have
little substantive content and are intended to delegate broad interpretive
power to agencies or courts. As to defining terms, as I have described
them, I would argue that Chevron deference is inappropriate. Because
these terms define the outer limits of delegated power and delineate the
basic structure of the particular regulatory scheme, it is important that the
federal courts play their law-declaring role and that agency power be
checked. While an agency's view as to the scope of its regulatory power is
relevant, and its arguments ought to be considered carefully, courts must
ultimately decide such questions. Complete deference to agency interpretations, on the other hand, makes more sense in dealing with ambiguities, gap-filling disputes, or the meaning of terms of art. Those cases deal
with the detailed application of the statutory mechanisms. The agency
has a legitimate interest in preserving its power to make consistent interpretations throughout the statute, and its expertise is more relevant.
Here too, the views of industry groups and outside experts familiar with
the statutory scheme often emerge in the regulatory process, and it makes
sense to give them considerable weight, unlike cases dealing with defining
terms. Congress obviously has an interest in these cases, but agency intory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
452 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 405 (1989).
221. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 359-63 (1994).
222. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 521.
223. None of these points is original with this author-all are made in the various articles cited supra note 220.
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terpretations carry less risk of distorting the overall statutory scheme or
exceeding the limits of Congress's delegation of power. For these types of
disputes, the Chevron approach works well.
A second flaw in Chevron is that it encourages, and indeed demands,
that courts ignore important process issues before the agency. If Congress has not spoken directly on the statutory issue in question, says the
opinion, the agency's interpretation will prevail as long as it is permissible. In practice, that is an easy standard to meet, meaning that almost all
agency interpretations are deferred to. Yet the quality of an agency's decision-making process should be highly relevant in these cases, and along
with the regulatory history should play a major role in the court's judgment. Such issues as the range of outside views considered and the depth
of the agency's analysis should weigh heavily in a decision to defer to an
agency interpretation, yet rarely do. Agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms ought not to be deferred to if they lack wide outside
input and in-depth analysis-mere rationality should not be enough to
displace the traditional primacy of the court over issues of law.
Third, Chevron proceeds from the highly questionable premise that
ambiguity in a statutory term implies congressional desire to cede interpretive authority to the relevant agency. This is perhaps the most serious
theoretical flaw in the opinion, and a number of commentators have
pointed out that the premise defies logic and experience. In fact, there
are many reasons for statutory ambiguity, including conscious political
decision, compromise, inadvertence, technical ignorance, and contextual
change over time. As Professor Farina has pointed out, there are a
number of possibilities regarding the intent of Congress in any such situation, including the possibility that Congress left an ambiguity but didn't
want the agency to resolve it.224 Chevron's two-step analysis assumes
that ambiguity equals an intent to allow the agency to resolve the ambiguity. As Judge Mikva has observed, sometimes the assumption should be
exactly the opposite. 225 In our case, for example, the intensity of Congress's interest in these definitions, and the passage of Section 623 itself,
may be taken to signal a desire to keep the interpretation within Congress and not to defer to agency interpretations. In my view, a case-bycase approach on this question, the practice before Chevron, is much
more desirable.
Fourth, the Chevron two-step framework gives insufficient weight to
the importance of federal courts as interpreters of federal law. This interest stems not just from the Constitution, as interpreted in Marbury, but
also from the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 706 of the APA,
226
after all, says clearly that the court shall determine all questions of law.
224. See Farina, supra note 1, at 468-76.
225. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERic LANE, LEGISLATIVWE PROCESs 802 (1995).
226. "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 706
(Supp. IV 1998).
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The Chevron opinion, then, is inconsistent with separation of powers and
with the thrust of the APA.
Ultimately, the interpretive problem presented by this study is one of
those that is inappropriate for Chevron deference because it goes to the
very heart of the 1996 Act and defines the limits of the regulatory scheme
devised by Congress. As a reviewing court, I would give careful consideration to the arguments raised by the FCC in its Report to Congress under
Section 623, but make my own independent analysis of the legislative history in search of the meanings of the terms "telecommunications" and
"information services."
But let us assume for a moment that a judge faithfully tried to carry out
the Chevron mandate in this case. How would she go about it, and what
would be the result?
First, it is not at all clear how a judge would apply step one to this
situation. Has Congress actually spoken to the precise question at issue
here? As I have attempted to show above, I believe the evidence is overwhelming that Congress designed a statutory scheme in which these two
key terms were mutually exclusive. However, that conclusion is not evident on the face of the definitions, or even from the surrounding statute.
The conclusion is sound only if you are willing to consider all of the layers
of meaning we explored, and it is not at all clear that a court conscientiously attempting to apply Chevron would go that far. A major open
question in Chevron jurisprudence is, after all, the meaning of ambiguity
itself, and here the Justices are at odds. Justice Stevens would clearly use
all available tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether Congress's meaning is clear,2 27 whereas Justice Scalia and those sharing his
views would ordinarily look only to the terms, their ordinary meanings,
228
and the immediate statutory context.
In this particular case, as it happens, the ultimate conclusion should be
the same whether the case is resolved at step one or step two. If a court
were to defer to agency interpretation, the completeness of the agency
opinion, the openness of its process, and the cogency of its reasoning all
compel acceptance of its conclusion as a "permissible" interpretation of
the statute.

227. The Chevron opinion, written by Justice Stevens, carefully examines legislative history in order to determine whether the statutory term at issue is ambiguous for purposes of
step one. 467 U.S. 837, 851-53, 862-64 (1983).
228. The conservatives' later restatements of the Chevron doctrine show this change in
the meaning of step one: "If the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain language of the statute,deference is due. In ascertaining whether the agency's interpretation is
a permissible construction of the language, a court must look to the structure and language
of the statute as a whole. If the text is ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some
respects, a degree of deference is granted to the agency, though a reviewing court need not
accept an interpretation which is unreasonable." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992) (emphasis added) (Kennedy, J.) (citations omitted).
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D.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECTION

623

CONGRESS AND THE

DIALOGUE BETWEEN

FCC

Perhaps the most intriguing questions to emerge from our study of this
particular disagreement about statutory meaning revolve around the
unique dialogue created by the enactment of Section 623 and the FCC's
response. How should a court later called upon to resolve the question of
statutory meaning treat this unique process? Is it a useful device for the
future?
Assume now that in future challenges to the FCC's universal service
policies, its decision to exempt Internet service providers from regulation,
or its treatment of Internet telephony, a court is called upon to decide
whether the definitions of "telecommunications" and "information service" in the 1996 Act are mutually exclusive. What role might the enactment of Section 623 and the FCC's response play in that decision?
First, a court might ask whether the enactment of 623 itself says something about the correctness of the FCC's original interpretation of the
terms. Certainly the pugnacious tone of the section suggests that Congress was unhappy with the FCC's interpretation. Yet if it could muster
the votes to pass this report requirement, why didn't Congress simply
clarify the definitions if it thought the Commission was on the wrong
track? Will an inquiring judge look more closely at the history of Section
623 and discover that it in fact does not signal widespread dissatisfaction
with the FCC's initial interpretations, but rather the dissatisfaction of two
key senators who were in a position to force the report requirement
through in conference? As reflected in the Chevron discussion above,
will the reviewing court read Section 623 as a declaration by Congress
that it does not wish to cede interpretive authority on these crucial definitions to the FCC, but rather wants to ensure that they stick close to discernable congressional intent? More broadly, does Section 623 signal a
different view toward the FCC's traditionally broad role in interpreting
the Communications Act, suggesting instead that with a largely new Act
229
the Congress wishes to keep the FCC on a much shorter leash?
In fact it is extremely difficult to infer any clear expression of congressional attitude from the fact of Section 623's enactment. I suspect that a
court would give no special weight to the fact of enactment, but would
rather look more closely at what Congress did during the entire sequence
of events. It is significant, therefore, that Congress, after challenging the
229. In Iowa Util. Bd., the Supreme Court in its first try at interpreting the 1996 Act
argued that the FCC should receive wide latitude in interpreting its provisions, because of
the statute's complexity and many ambiguities:
It would be a gross understatement to say that the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 is not a model of clarity. It is in many important respects a model of

ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction. That is most unfortunate for a
piece of legislation that profoundly affects a crucial segment of the economy
worth tens of billions of dollars ....

But Congress is well aware that the

ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute will be resolved by the implementing agency.
Iowa Util. Bd. V. FCC, 119 S. Ct. 721, 738 (1999).
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FCC to justify its interpretations and then participating in the process of
reassessment, did not even try to amend the definitions after receiving
the Commission's report in April 1998. This fact, coupled with the enactment of definitions in the Internet Tax Freedom Act six months later that
ratify the FCC's position, suggests that Congress agrees with the FCC's
analysis. It lends weight to the view (undoubtedly correct) that the formal call for a report on the definitions did not mean that Congress as a
whole disagreed with the earlier FCC attempts at interpretation, but
rather was one skirmish in the complex battle over universal service policies as a whole.
A related question might also occur to the reviewing court. Should it
treat the FCC's report in this situation any differently than it treats other
formal agency opinions interpreting a statute, when making its Chevron
analysis? I suspect here that the answer would be yes. A reviewing court
could not help but be impressed with the depth and completeness of the
dialogue in this case, and should give especially heavy weight to the
FCC's conclusions. After all, the agency not only interpreted the key definitions in the statute initially, after an elaborate rulemaking proceeding,
but after a formal direction by Congress it went over the same ground in
even more depth. A reviewing court considering Chevron deference
should give heavy weight to agency interpretations arrived at through
such a participatory process, including the views of key members of Congress, the Executive Branch, industry groups, states, and other entities.
One tricky element in a court's consideration of the FCC Report to
Congress might be the fact that one of the five FCC Commissioners dissented, but that issue alone is probably not enough to significantly modify
the deference otherwise due in light of the FCC's elaborate interpretive
process.
Finally, what can be said about the utility of this kind of interpretive
dialogue? My guess is that it will remain a rare event for Congress to
formally enact a specific demand for agency interpretation of a statute,
but our study shows that the process has much to recommend it.230 If the
point is to ensure that the FCC carries out the statutory mechanism as
Congress intended, then this give and take makes it much more likely
that it will happen. Not only do key congressional actors get a second or
third chance to influence the FCC's thinking, but the Commission is
230. Actually, Congress used the same report device again while waiting for the Sec.
623 report from the FCC. In the 1998 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill, the
Senate required the FCC to do another report on universal service funding and administrative structure. S. 1768, 105th Cong. (1998). Section 2005(b)(3)(g) of the bill required the
FCC to explain how to reconcile Secs. 254(d) and 254(h) of the 1996 Act in determining
the revenue base for universal service funding. Cong. Rec, S. 2459 (Mar 24, 1998). Incidentally, the provision directs the FCC not to use rulemaking in preparing its report, presumably because the report was due in less than sixty days. Id. Sec. 2005(b)(2)(B). In a
bizarre procedural twist, the House-Senate conference on the final bill, H.R. 3579, deleted
the Senate provision, but in report language directed the FCC to, among other things,
comply with "the reporting requirement of the Senate bill." The FCC then prepared another report to Congress. See infra note 85.
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forced to justify in great detail its statutory interpretations and to openly
examine the legislative history. In addition, the Commission is forced to
articulate its policy goals more explicitly, so that Congress might amend
the statute if it finds them unacceptable. Certainly Senator Stevens's initial goal of pushing the FCC into a clear position on these issues is often
desirable in other contexts, enabling Congress to act more formally if it
wishes.
The other advantage of the process under study is its openness and
wide participation. It should be recalled, however, that this is not necessarily a requirement in cases where agencies are called upon to report to
Congress on matters of statutory interpretation. The FCC wisely concluded that its interpretations would carry more weight, both with Congress and with the courts, if it conducted a participatory proceeding under
APA Section 553. Future Congresses attempting to use this device would
be well advised to require such procedures and not leave them to the
discretion of the agency. This openness ensures that a genuine policy debate will take place, and that the views of industry trade groups, technical
experts, and a wide variety of other interested parties will be taken into
account in making crucial decisions on the meaning of these statutory
terms. Because they are defining terms, as noted above, much turns on
the definitions, and the FCC's open process helps ensure that the right
decisions are made.
Of course such a formal give-and-take is not really desirable or necessary for less important issues of statutory meaning. It is simply too timeconsuming and cumbersome. Given that agencies' interpretations are
likely to prevail under Chevron in many cases, however, Congress might
well turn to the formally enacted report requirement as a way of controlling the interpretive process where genuinely significant terms are in
question. 231 It can then leave for more informal processes, such as hearings at which administrators are required to justify statutory interpretations, or even more informal calls for reports, the less important
interpretive issues. Given the amount of agency effort devoted to the
Section 623 Report over five months, it certainly seems unwise to require
such efforts casually for unimportant statutory terms.
V.

CONCLUSION

We began this expedition in search of the meanings of "telecommunications" and "information service" with the observation that some
problems of statutory interpretation may not present comparably complex backgrounds. If the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is any gauge,
however, these especially demanding interpretive tasks are no longer a
231. Ironically, Chevron deference means that an unhappy Congress that forces an
agency into formal statutory interpretation and still doesn't like the result may well have
made it more likely that the courts will side with the agency.
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rarity.2 32 Despite the currently fashionable political rhetoric about deregulation and less government, Congress continues to pass regulatory legislation of bewildering complexity. Gaps, ambiguities, and inconsistencies
are inevitable. I have presented this interpretive case study in its full
multi-layered glory to demonstrate that judges and agencies should not
be shut off artificially from any sources that shed light on the meaning of
a statutory provision. While some may be more reliable or probative
than others, all the layers of legislative, administrative, and judicial activity can help to lead the careful interpreter to the most reasonable and
practicable reading of a statute. And when they do not, when assiduous
efforts to uncover the sources of particular text lead to hopeless confusion
and inconsistency, at least we can be certain that the agency or court has
done all it could to discern Congress's scheme before turning the issue
back for amendment or clarification.
I hope this case study has also shown that the literature on statutory
interpretation can benefit from more exposure to in-depth analysis of real
legislative, judicial, and administrative materials. We need more archaeology, in other words, and less hermeneutics. This is particularly true, as
in this case, when we deal with difficult regulatory statutes administered
by experienced and expert agencies. It is here where, as I have argued,
the narrow textualist who limits himself to the text itself, its commonly
understood meanings, and closely related statutory language, is most
likely to leave the real world behind and distort Congress's regulatory
plan.
If, as I predict, subtle and difficult issues of statutory meaning will continue to arise in the regulatory arena, then the four-way dialogue among
congressional actors, agency personnel, judges and interested outside parties can be expected to continue. Chevron has not disposed of all the
issues of assigning interpretive responsibility; indeed it seems to have created as many questions as it has answered. Because the stakes are so high
with statutory schemes such as the Telecommunications Act of 1996, all
of the interested parties have incentives to develop new devices to "win"
the interpretive contest. Congress, frustrated that agencies and the courts
do not carry out its regulatory desires, will explore new means of oversight and may turn again to creative statutory mechanisms like the one
232. The Court of Appeals grappled with a difficult question of statutory interpretation
concerning two different ways for incumbent local telephone companies to comply with the
interconnection requirements of the 1996 Act, and thus be permitted to enter the long
distance market, in SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 138 F.3d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1998). It deferred to
FCC judgments in part because of substantial linguistic confusion and poor statutory drafting by Congress. Here there were no clear guides in the legislative history and no long
regulatory experience to draw on. Another example in the 1996 Act, sure to reach the
Court of Appeals, is the proper interpretation of Sec. 202(g) concerning television local
marketing agreements. The text, as well as its relation to other provisions, is quite confusing. Congress tried to influence the FCC's interpretation in a free-standing item of report
language unrelated to statutory language, in a conference report. 143 CONG. REC. H6175
(daily ed. July 19, 1997). In its recent Report and Order on TV Ownership Rules, the FCC
interpreted the provision and ignored the later instructions. Commission's Regulations
Governing Television Broadcasting, 1999 WL 591756 (F.C.C.) (Aug. 6, 1999).
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used in this case. Agencies will develop better internal procedures for
developing and justifying their interpretations. Interested industry
groups and public interest organizations will take advantage of new opportunities like the Section 623 rule making proceeding in this case to
influence interpretation. And the courts will continue to struggle with
Chevron and to modify it. Hopefully the public interest in rational, purposeful, and efficient government will be the ultimate beneficiary.
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